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Matthew Certosimo* Does Canada Need a
Social Charter?
I. Introduction:
Over the decade since the birth of the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms,1 expectations that it would impact greatly on the lives of
Canadians have gone largely unfulfilled for those regarded as being the
most in need of its protection. A recent decision of the Nova Scotia
County Court has reminded critics that the narrow interpretation given
the Charter's equality2 and security oftheperson3 provisions, particularly
with regard to social and economic rights, excludes from its purview the
well-being of Canadians in economic need.
In DartmouthlHalifax County Regional Housing Authority v. Irma
Sparks (1992), 4 the insufficiencies of the courts' interpretation of the
Charter was all too clearly illustrated to Ms. Sparks. Evicted on one
month's notice from public housing, in accordance with the Residential
Tenancies Act which excludes public housing from the general security
of tenure provisions and defers to the lease,5 Chief Justice Palmeter was
unwilling to accord Ms. Sparks the protection of either s.7 or s. 15 of the
Charter. With his ruling, the Chief Justice adopted the traditional
reluctance of the judiciary to interpret the Charter as protecting social and
economic rights, 6 and again provided evidence of the need for either a
renewed mandate for or an amendment to the Charter.
* Matthew Certosimo is a 3rd year law student at Dalhousie University. This paper received
a 1992 J.S.D. Tory Writing Competition Award prize. The author would like to thank Professor
A. Wayne MacKay of Dalhousie for his invaluable guidance with this project.
1. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part 1 of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B of the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982 (April 17) c. 11, [Hereinafter the Charter].
2. Charter, s.15(1).
3. Charter, s.7.
4. County Court of Halifax, Nova Scotia, C.H. No.75171 (April 13, 1992), [unreported],
[hereinafter Sparks].
5. Residential Tenancies Act, R.S.N.S. 1989, c.401, ss. 10(8)(d) and 25(2).
6. For clarity, it is worthwhile to note that the social and economic rights considered in this
analysis are those which might be termed "basic needs" rights. Simply put, these rights include
such guarantees as the right to social assistance, health care, housing, employment, education,
environment, and culture, as are most commonly protected in many national and international
constitutions, such as the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
signed 1966, Annex to G.A. Res. 2200A, 21 U.N GAOR, Supp. (No.16) 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316,
(1966). It is not within the ambit of this study to consider the impact of economic rights
decisions on corporations.
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The proposition that our Charter should protect social and economic
rights is not particular to Nova Scotia nor to this stage of our constitution
evolution. Recent decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada have also
placed into jeopardy the existing social network that Canadians generally
regard as being a "part of our national identity."7 As well, the courts'
reluctance to provide protection for these "second tier rights,"' leaving
only the slightest of openings for the "living tree"9 to grow through, has
all but confirmed the view that the Charter in its present form may
undermine advances in,'0 or at least remain an unreliable means of
achieving, substantive equality.
Although various models of a social charter, or a social and economic
rights covenant, have emerged as a legal response to these realities, the
basic objective of entrenching the principle of basic economic equality
would appear to be a consistent characteristic. A number of questions
have arisen, however, in the process: What exactly is basic economic
equality, and what constitutes the "basic needs" of subsistence worthy of
being guaranteed? Should social and economic rights be justiciable, or
are such matters exclusively policy issues within the jurisdiction of an
elected parliament? What duty, if any, does government have to obviate
socio-economic disparities? In light of the courts' interpretation of s.7 of
the Charter, which has generally seen economic rights as being beyond
its purview, how can an interpretive clause widen the section's application?
Will the acceptance of social assistance recipients as a discrete and insular
minority within the meaning of s. 15 of the Charter become widespread
or will a further amendment to the Charter be necessary for such an
interpretation of the equality rights section? And, of course, will any
changes to the Charter only formally affect the circumstances of Canadians
such as Ms. Sparks, or can Charter reform achieve more than merely
raised expectations?
It is proposed herein that the protection of social and economic rights
within the rubric of the Charter, as it is, would not be inconsistent with
the document's philosophical underpinnings. While the Supreme Court
7. Minutes, Nova Scotia Premier Don Cameron, Leader of the Official Opposition Vincent
MacLean and Leader of the New Democratic Party Alexa McDonough, Joint Parliamentary
Committee on a Renewed Canada (January 16, 1992).
8. Globe & Mail, January 13, 1992, at A4.
9. Edwards v.A.G. Canada, [ 1930] A.C. 124,136, per Lord Sankey: "A living tree capable of
growth and expansion within its natural limits."
10. A. Petter, "Immaculate Deception: The Charter's Hidden Agenda," 45 Advocate 857,
(hereinafter "Petter").
11. For a critique of the "formal equality," as opposed to substantive socio-economic equality,
protected by the Charter, cf. J. Bakan, "Constitutional Interpretation and Social Change: You
Can't Always Get What You Want (Nor What You Need)," 70 Can. Bar Rev. 307.
570 The Dalhousie Law Journal
has left slightly open the possibility of such an interpretation, those who
want greater certainty that the Charter and the Constitution will ensure
security to the socio-economically disadvantaged have proposed
amendments intended to explicitly so provide. In two important decisions,
Reference re: Canada Assistance Plan2 with respect to the role of
governments in Canada, and Reference re: ss. 193 & 195.1(1)(c) of the
Criminal Code3 with respect to the role of the courts and the rights of
individuals, the Supreme Court of Canada has signalled that it is reluctant
to intervene in such issues. Perhaps, therefore, proponents of a social
charter are correct to view amendments to the Charter and/or the
Constitution as being their best means of achieving a legal regime
supportive of the values Canadians are said to share with respect to their
network of social programs.
One such comprehensive proposal for a new social charter, put
forward by a national coalition of community groups, includes a social
and economic rights interpretive clause for the Charter, protection of
existing Charter rights, a statement of government responsibilities, and
a social rights tribunal and monitoring body.14 Less ambitious suggestions
have been made by various premiers and the Joint Parliamentary
Committee on a Renewed Canada."
Prior to assessing these proposals more closely, an analysis of the
theoretical background of the Charter, in which the philosophical,
historical and international influences and contexts are contemplated,
and a consideration of how the Charteris presently being applied to social
and economic rights questions, will illustrate three central points: first of
all, the Charter is not antithetical to being interpreted as protecting social
and economic rights; and, secondly, the proposed social "C",' 6 therefore,
would not be a revolutionary change to our Charter, or be out of step with
constitutions and charters generally; and, thirdly, the amendments
necessary to ensure that the Charter is applied by the courts to protect
social and economic rights do not have to be too extensive in order to
achieve, as is possible with ajudicially interpreted constitutional document,
greater social security for Canadians.
12. (1991), 58 B.C.L.R. (2d) 1 (SCC).
13. [1990], 1 S.C.R. 1123.
14. Bruce Porter,"Draft Social Charter" (February 25, 1992), Centre for Equality Rights in
Accommodation, Toronto [hereinafter the Porter Proposal].
15. Final Report, Third Session of the Thirty-fourth Parliament, 1991-92, Joint Chairs Hon. G.
Beaudoin, Senator, and D. Dobbie, M.P. (February 28, 1992).
16. covenant, charter, contract
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Thus, it will be the goal of this paper to identify the subtle weaving of
a net of guarantees to social and economic justice that exist within
Canada's Charter, thereby establishing the framework upon which a new
social "C" may liberate these social and economic rights.
II. Context
Amid the coincidence of events that has the destabilizing paths of a
recession and constitutional renegotiation merging, the concept of a
social charter or covenant has emerged, raising questions about the very
nature of the rights and freedoms of the Charter. In the 1990's, the effects
of the recession saw an approximate "one million Ontario residents being
social assistance beneficiaries," a 37% increase between March of 1990
and March 1991.17 With this kind of growing dependency upon the social
network and cases such as the Sparks decision, which serve to illuminate
the weaknesses of that net, the Charter's apparent incapacity to fill in
those gaps has caused a revisiting of the substantive meaning of Charter
liberty, security of the person and equality.
Canadians generally have great pride in their social programs, reflecting
a national effort to diminish socio-economic inequality. As the federal
government's discussion paper, Shared Values: The Canadian Identity
summarized:
Our social safety net helps to defie the notions of equality, community
and responsibility as they are developing in Canada. We believe that all
Canadians are entitled, as Canadians, to basic services, regardless of where
they live in Canada. 8
Indeed, the importance of Canada's present network of social programs
has been compared with the role played in unifying the country that the
railway once played, 19 and as the "key ingredient" in the "recipe for
national unity."20 It is argued, therefore, that a social charter, which would
entrench certain guarantees to the provision of basic needs, would help to
unify Canadians around those shared values and pride.
When one looks beyond the mythology which has evolved around
Canada's social programs, however, one sees that many Canadians have
17. R. Ellsworth & I. Morrison,"Poverty Law in Ontario: The Year in Review" (1991), 7 J. of
Law & Social Pol'y 1, 13.
18. Federal Government Discussion Paper,"Canada Round"Constitutional Negotiations,
Shared Values: The Canadian Identity (Fall, 1991), at 21.
19. "For Canadians, Confederation has come to mean not only the creation of a single,
transcontinental economy, but the creation of a nation where the social fabric is strengthened
by shared values and by a network of social programs." Ontario Government Discussion Paper,
A Canadian Social Charter: Making Our Shared Values Stronger (September, 1991), at 1.
20. "Canada Reconsidered: The Social Charter" (January 13, 1992), Globe & Mail, at A4.
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slipped through the holes in the net, despite the lofty objectives. The
growth in the number of food banks and the widening of the strata of
Canadian society relying upon these non-governmental agencies for
survival is indicative of the these gaps in the governmental social
network:21
About 42% of the Metro [Halifax] Food Bank Society's recipients are
children under 18 .... A study released yesterday by Statistics Canada
indicates children made up a disproportionate number of Canadians who
sought aid from food banks in 1990. 2
Particularly since the recession of the 1980's, more and more Canadians
have come to rely upon food banks for their basic subsistence, 2 yet since
1966 the federal and provincial governments have been committed to
ensuring "adequate assistance to and in respect of persons in need,"24
which includes provision of "basic requirements," as outlined in s.2 of the
Canada Assistance Act:
2. In this Act,
"assistance" means aid in any form to or in respect of persons in need for
the purpose of providing for all or any of the following:
(a) food, shelter, clothing, fuel, utilities, household supplies, and personal
requirements (hereinafter referred to as "basic requirements") .... 25
Adding to this dichotomy between goals and reality has been the
federal government's decision to reduce their contribution to the Canada
Assistance Plan, and the Supreme Court of Canada's judgement that such
unilateral decisions of Parliament are not reviewable by the courts. In
Reference re: Canada Assistance Plan,26 Sopinka J. ruled that the
structure of the statute indicates that the specific payment obligations of
the federal government are authorized "from time to time," and therefore
amendments to the financial obligations remain within the ambit of
parliamentary sovereignty. In addition, the Supreme Court held that the
doctrine of legitimate expectations, found by the British Columbia Court
21. "Graduates more evident at food banks; Figures in Toronto region reveal 40% have high
school education" (Tuesday, March 17, 1992), Globe & Mail, (report on Statistics Canada,
Canadian Social Trends food bank use in Canada study, 1990-91); forregional perspective, see
also "Food bank numbers reflect national trend" (March 17, 1992) Halifax Daily News.
22."Food bank numbers reflect national trend" (March 17, 1992), Daily News, at 4.
23. R.E. Robertson "The Right to Food: Canada's Broken Covenant" (1989-90), 6 Can. H.R.
Yb. 185, 193.
24. The Canada Assistance Plan, R.S.C. 1985, Vol.1, C-1.
25. Ibid.
26. (1991), 58 B.C.L.R. (2d) 1 (SCC).
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of Appeal to limit the authority of the federal government to affect
unilaterally its obligation under the agreement, did not create substantive
rights that bound Parliament.
Thus, it is in this context that the Sparks ruling serves only to remind
us that the objective of substantive equality is not necessarily being
served by our present network, nor by the "supreme law of Canada."27 As
the facts of the case showed, Ms. Sparks is a 42 year-old, Black Nova
Scotian, single-parent with two children. Their sole source of income is
$767.00/month from provincial social assistance, $173.00/month of
which satisfied her rent-geared-to-income. Prior to her eviction notice,
she had lived in public housing for over ten years.
As part of his ruling, Chief Justice Palmeter took judicial notice of the
disproportionate number of Black, women and social assistant recipients
who occupy public housing and who make-up the waiting list for
admittance into such subsidized accommodation. Quoting from the
National Council of Welfare 1990 report entitled Women and Poverty
Revisited, Palmeter C.J. "accept[ed]" that single-parent mothers have
more difficulty securing "appropriate housing" and in getting by
economically:
Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation reports that 40 percent of
female single parents under 65 have "core" housing needs, meaning their
housing is either too crowded, physically inadequate or costs more than 30
percent of their total income. In the Atlantic Provinces, many single
parents pay more than 50 percent of their income for an apartment.
Families on social assistance in New Brunswick spend more than 65
percent of their income for rent.'
Yet, Palmeter C.J. also held that, while she was treated differently from
private housing tenants by the Residential Tenancies Act, and though she
would suffer a particular disadvantage because of her circumstances and
such different treatment, Ms. Sparks had not made a prima facie case of
adverse effect discrimination. Furthermore, the ruling applied the decision
in Bernard v. Dartmouth Housing Authority, 9 in which the Nova Scotia
Appeal Division held that s.7 Charter protection did not extend to the
kind of proprietary benefit that public housing provided, and thus its
withdrawal was not a contravention of one's security of the person
rights."
27. Constitution, s.52(l).
28. National Council of Welfare, Women and Poverty Revisited (Summer, 1990), at 79, in
Sparks, at 10.
29. (1988), 88 N.S.R. (2d) 190, (N.S.S.C.A.D.).
30. Sparks, at 32.
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III. Theoretical Background
1. The liberalism of the Charter
In spite of decisions such as Sparks, or the more cynical perspectives on
the Charter, the concept of entrenched social and economic rights as a
means of achieving substantive rights is not necessarily antithetical to the
traditions of liberalism, or the development of Canada's Charter. While
some regard the proposed social charter as anathema to our constitutional
foundation, a closer reading of these principles illustrates that, on the
contrary, the entrenchment of social and economic rights may well be the
appropriate next phase in our constitutional development, if such protection
is not already included in the Charter.
Andrew Petter has called the Charter a "19th Century document set
loose on a 20th Century welfare state." 31 For him, the absence of explicit
references to "positive economic or social entitlements" is indicative of
the Charter's focus on protecting individuals from the state, without
regard necessarily for the achievement of substantive equality.32 Joel
Bakan argues that the nature of negative rights discourse, where the state
is cast as the prime enemy of liberty, precludes the Charter from being a
reliable tool of social change:
... it seems naive, almost silly, to think that with the Charter in place all
we have to do is cook up imaginative legal arguments and go to court for
the realization of an egalitarian and just society.33
It should be admitted that while the Charter, as a constitutional
document, may be a "living tree," it is not a living, social or political
activist. The Charter can only provide, as Leon Trakman has argued, the
legal framework within which these social activists and the rest of us act:
".... the text of the Charter itself does not constitute law in action; it is only
an instrument of those who embark upon social action. ' 'M Therefore,
while Bakan is no doubt correct in his point that other institutional
changes, such as the eradication of financial barriers to the equal access
of the courts,35 are required as part of the effort to achieve substantive
equality, the Charter, as a constitutional document, nevertheless has a
role to play. Furthermore, Petter's argument that, in that context, the
Charter is incapable of moving beyond a century old doctrine, places the
31. Petter, supra, note 10.
32. Ibid.
33. Bakan, supra, note 11, at 328.
34. L. Trakman, Reasoning with the Charter (Toronto: Butterworths, 1991), at 3, (hereinafter
"Trakman").
35. Bakan, supra, note 11, at 319.
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Charter in a box, indeed the wrong box, which ignores much of the
tradition from which it has grown.
Lorenne Clark has responded to Petter's critique by exposing this
strawperson, created perhaps for argument's sake. The main theoretical
premise of Petter's critique is that the Charter's liberalism restricts social
progress because it identifies incorrectly the source of inequality.36 Clark
notes that Petter's disagreement is with classical liberalism, with its
origins in the ideas of theorists such as Locke,37 which she classifies as
"minimalist"liberalism, not with themodem liberalism ofthoseinfluenced
by the later writings of J.S. Mill, or "maximalist" liberalism:"
I am of the view that liberalism has more flesh on its bones than the cynics
would have us believe, and that it contains within itself principles which
give it the ability to transcend some of the more objectionable
presuppositions and to find new and different contexts for valid principles
whose past instantiations have not only outlived their usefulness but have
become real impediments to both liberty. 9
Trakman makes a similar point when he introduces his analysis of the
Charter with a clear mission statement:
In this book, I seek to reconcile Charter liberalism with the modem needs
of Canadian society by arguing that private rights are a subset of the social
sphere. To distinguish parental discipline from abuse, and consenting sex
from sexual assault, is to make a social, not simply a private choice... The
purpose is to do more than identify rights as they are: it is to contextualize
them in light of their prospective social benefits and effects. It is to shift
them from a narrow liberal conversation to a multifaceted and human
context within a participatory democracy.'
Thus, the maximalist view of liberalism allows for the advocacy of
substantive equality, to overcome unjustified discrimination and promote
greater equality, within the rubric of the Charter.4' Indeed, such an
approach to the Charter is consistent with the social framework within
which it has developed, and the philosophical origins from whence it
came.
36. Petter, supra, note 10.
37. cf. Two Treatises on Government (1689): Locke's view was that liberty could be defined
as freedom, not just of choice, but also of action. In the context of the divine right of kings, the
concept of negative rights, liberty of speech and of thought from the control of the kings and
the church, was liberalism in the 17th Century.
38. L. Clark, "Liberalism and the Living-Tree: Women, Equality and the Charter"(1990), 28
Alta.L.R. 384.
39. Ibid.
40. Trakman, at 1, 2.
41. Clark, supra. note 38.
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Canada has placed emphasis upon the creation of a modem welfare
state,42 which may be attributed to the influences of modem Canadian
liberalism,43 and remains a reflection of the fundamental values that today
Canadians are said to share."4 And, while it is true that Charter rights
should not be seen as the "products of one determinative ideology
advanced by one philosopher king, prime minister or premier," 45 the
original arguments for an entrenched "bill of rights" were influenced a
great deal by the theories propagated by Pierre Trudeau, who also
regarded the protection of progressive economic rights as being within
the constitutional traditions of Canada. To paraphrase, Trudeau wrote
that lawyers should be reminded that civil rights are but one aspect of
human rights, and that economic equality should not be neglected.
46
Another influence on the development of this country's Constitution,
and modem welfare state, the late Bora Laskin, also found classical
liberalism the antithesis of substantive equality. While aHarvard graduate
student, Laskin argued that the "furtherance of the goal of equality
required positive legal measures." '47 "Utterly dismissive of classical
liberalism," 48 Laskin believed that it was the role of the legislatures, not
the courts, to bring about positive legal measures. While the role of the
judiciary will be discussed later, it is helpful to appreciate that Laskin's
influences upon his writings in this area included the new deal era dispute
between the progressive governments and the conservative, that is
classically liberal, judiciary.49
42. Martha Jackman, "The Protection of Welfare Rights Under the Charter" (1988), 20
Ott.L.R. 257,266.
43. Clark, supra, note 38.
44. NB. October, 1991, Environics poll showed 85% (88% in Quebec) approved of"a social
charter that would guarantee the right to health care, social assistance and education." W.
Kymlicka & W. Norman, The Social Charter Debate: Should Social Justice Be
Constitutionalized?. (Ottawa: Network on the Constitution, January, 1992), at 1,2, (hereinafter
"Kymlicka & Norman").
45. Trakman, at 3.
46. P.E. Trudeau, "Economic Rights," (1962), 8 McGill L.J. 121.
47. B. Laskin, "The Protection of Interests by Statute and the Problem of Contracting Out"
1938), 16 Can. Bar Rev. 669, 675, in R.J. Sharpe, "Bora Laskin and Civil Liberties" (1985),
35 U.T. L.J. 632, 639, (hereinafter "Sharpe").
48. Ibid. NB: The reader should be aware that Laskin apparently included J.S. Mills' Essay on
Liberty (1859) in the category of classical liberalism. A thorough response to such a
classification of Mills is not necessary for the purposes of this paper. It is worthwhile to note,
however, that it is Mills' later works, particularly The Subjection of Women (1869), which
modem liberals rely upon as a source.
49. Sharpe, at 638.
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So, as it has been pointed out, "whether the Charter makes a positive
difference is ultimately up to those who make it grow, or retard it."'50 The
question, then, is to what extent is the Charter retarding social progress,
and how can it grow, perhaps in form, rather than simply interpretation,
to prevent it from being a further impediment to substantive equality. As
Trudeau put it, paraphrasing Anatole France recently, one rightly pokes
fun at the law which, "with majestic impartiality, denie[s] the rich as well
as the poor the right to sleep under bridges.'
2. The positivelnegative rights dichotomy
In the context of social and economic rights, the liberalism of the Charter
has been particularly criticized for the manner in which it has been
interpreted. Specifically, the rights of the Charter have been viewed
primarily as being "negative rights," the rights necessary to be protected
from the state. On the other hand, it has been suggested that "positive
rights," which require the state to do thingsfor the individual or group to
achieve equality, would be a "radical break with the liberal-democratic
constitutional tradition" of Canada. 2
On the contrary, however, the Charter itself, as well as its philosophical
origins are not necessarily in conflict with the promotion and protection
of positive rights. It is perhaps true, though, that the Charter has not been
allowed to grow to the extent that it could, as a result of courts' preference
for narrow interpretations. Founded upon a concern for parliamentary
sovereignty, the court has often deferred to the political process,
53
balanced only by Charter protection of the person's freedom from
negative impositions upon their liberty:
The Canadian Charter ofRights and Freedoms is a purposive document.
Its purpose is to guarantee and to protect, within the limits of reason, the
enjoyment of the rights and freedoms it enshrines. It is intended to
constrain governmental action inconsistent with those rights and freedoms;
it is not in itself an authorization for governmental action.(my emphasis)54
For some, this negative rights approach is a reflection of a "systemic
bias," a conspiracy by those with wealth and control over the state who
50. Trakman, at 5.
51. T. Axworthy & P.E. Trudeau, eds., Towards a Just Society (Markham: Penguin Books,
1990), at 359.
52. Kymlicka & Norman, at 2.
53. cf. "Weaker Charter protection feared: Priority changing, retired judge says," (April 16,
1992), Globe & Mail: "The Supreme Court of Canada's interpretation of the Charter ofRights
and Freedoms has shifted so that it is more likely government objectives will take precedence
over individual rights, former court member Bertha Wilson says."
54. Hunter v. Southam, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145, 156, per Dickson J. (as he then was).
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oppose redistribution for reasons of self-interest, that prevails within the
Charter's rights.55 A distinction must be made, however, between the
explicit inclusion of negative rights in the Charter, which are important
protection against state abuses, and the apparent exclusion of positive
rights. Since the two forms of rights are not inimical, but are in fact
cooperative in support of substantive freedom, these critics of the Charter
should not cast too wide their rhetorical net:
Freedom of speech, freedom from arbitrary arrest and seizure, freedom of
religion, conscience, and opinion, freedom to come and go in public places
as one chooses, political rights of participation, and such like, are in
principle neutral as between different systems of distribution and allocation
of economic goods. Hence, it is always a bogus argument that "bourgeois
liberties" such as these are inimical to a fair distribution of economic
goods, or a fortiori that liberty in these respects is a mere adjunct of a
bourgeois system of private ownership of the means of production,
distribution and exchange. 6
Others consider the protection of the individual from the state as being
the first, not the only, step in achieving equality.57 Laskin, for one, ranked
and classified liberties, placing fundamental political liberties, such as
freedoms of association and religion, at the apex of his pyramid, and
egalitarian liberty, such as equal employment opportunities, was "relegated
to an inferior position in the hierarchy of civil liberties. 58 In order for
democracy to work, Laskin felt that protection from the state required for
political freedom necessarily ranked above economic equality, but not to
its exclusion. Indeed, as Trakman put it: "negative rights are necessary
aspects of public life.... h]owever, public life is not expressed solely by
the negative right to be free from state intervention." 59
Admittedly, the conventional interpretation of Wilson J.'s judgement
in Morgentaler, with her discussion of the metaphorical "invisible fence"
erected around the individual for protection against the state,60 has
justifiably placed an emphasis on her argument for a woman's rights to
be autonomous from state interference of herreproductive decisions. Yet,
in the same judgement, we also get a glimpse of how "second tier" or
positive rights might necessarily also flow from s.7 of the Charter, in the
context of individual liberty and a person's place in society.
55. Petter. Nb: "conspiracy" is my word.
56. N. MacCormick, Legal Rights & Social Democracy: Essays in Legal and Political
Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), at 149-150.
57. Trudeau, in Towards a JustSociety, supra, note 51, at 359, note 3, quotes Maritain, quoting
Saint Thomas Aquinas commenting Aristotle: "Equality comes after justice, and underlies the
principle and origin of friendship."
58. Sharpe, at 635, 639.
59. Trakman, at 10.
60.Morgentaler,SmolingandScottv.The Queen, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30, [hereinafter, Morgentaler].
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As Dickson C.J. writes in Morgentaler, the court has been reluctant to
"explore the broadest implications of s.7," as such an assessment would
not be "necessary or wise."'6' Similrly, Wilson J.'s judgement should be
considered in light of the nature of the matter before the court in
Morgentaler, which she classified as being fundamentally about the
autonomy of individual women, "over important decisions affecting their
lives,' 62 that liberty protects in this case. Perhaps Wilson's tempering of
her view of the liberalism of the Charter results from her belief that a
woman's rights should be seen as a particularly social phenomenon. 63 On
the other hand, her discussions of liberty have been wider than that
perspective would suggest. Placed in the context of her other s.7 decisions,
in particular Singh v. MEIC,64 one can see the sketching of a more
expansive, generous interpretation of s.7 protection.
To begin with, the first sketch worth scrutinizing in Wilson J.'s
judgement in Morgentaler is her enthusiastic use of the work of Neil
MacCormick, in her discussion of "liberty". MacCormick's view of
liberty, quoted with approval by Wilson J., is defined in part as "a
condition of self-respect and contentment which resides in the ability to
pursue one's own conception of a full and rewarding life."(my emphasis)65
It has been the argument of many that an ability to pursue liberty is far too
dependent in our society upon the socio-economic status that an individual
possesses. It would appear that Wilson J. is acknowledging the necessity
of substantive equality to achieve actual liberty, an approach which
requires more from the Charter than simply the protection of negative
rights. This interpretation of her independent judgement in Morgentaler
is substantiated by her use of MacCormick.
In the essay Wilson J. cites, MacCormick argues that "factual liberty"
does not necessarily entail unfettered liberty of action. Agreeing with
Kant and Rawls, MacCormick concludes as follows:
A person's right to liberty is, as a moral right, a right to so much liberty as
is consistent with every other person having liberty.... Any freedom
which one person enjoys atthe cost of another's disproportionate unfreedom
is not an exercise of the former's freedom, but a denial of the latter's.66
61. Ibid., at 51.
62. Ibid., at 171.
63. Trakman, at 186.
64. [1985] 1 S.C.R. 177.
65. Per WilsonJ. (not in majority),Morgentaler at (7-80), from Neil MacCormick,LegalRight
and Social Democracy: Essays in Legal and Political Philosophy (1982), at 41, (hereinafter
"MacCormick").
66. MacCormick, at 42.
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It is on the basis of this logic that MacCormick goes on to argue that,
... an economic order which denies such goods as these [full stomach, roof
over one's head, the opportunity to maintain these by a decent day's work]
to some persons, or which systematically distributes them in grossly
unequal measure, is as inimical to the equal claim of every person to
self-respect as is a political order which represses liberty unduly or
distributes it in systematically unequal shares.67
Thus, it is with these parameters in mind that MacCormick states what,
then, is the right to liberty, a concept adopted, in part, by Wilson J. in
Morgentaler:
That right [to liberty] is a right of each person to so much liberty as
everyone can enjoy, subject to the satisfaction of other conditions of
self-respect and the pursuit of contentment, a proviso which covers at least
the right to economic fairness...
68
If Wilson J. intended to approve of MacCormick's concept of liberty,
which was contrasted by him with the classical liberal perspective, it may
be that she intended that s.7's protection of liberty includes positive,
egalitarian rights.69
This approach'to Wilson J.'s judgement in Morgentaler is further
substantiated by her reference to her decision inR. v.Jones,7° in which she
relies upon J.S. Mill:
John Stuart Mill described ["liberty"] as "pursuing our own good in our
own way." This, he believed, we should be free to do "so long as we do not
attempt to deprive others of theirs or impede their efforts to obtain it."
In his later works, Mill's concept of rights included the view that, in order
to achieve substantive equality, providing for the ability of women, for
example, to overcome the impediments to their efforts to obtain liberty,
positive efforts had to be put in place:
But I may go further, and maintain that the course of history, and the
tendencies of progressive human society, afford not only no
presumption in favour of this system of inequality of rights, but a
strong one against it .... this relic of the past [women's subjection to
men] is discordant with the future, and must necessarily disappear.
Mill clearly recognized sexual inequality as a systemic problem rooted in
blatant discrimination against women. ... Thus, the primary job of
government in relation to the elimination of sexual inequality is to disavow
any justification for the continuing exercise of an unjustified authority of
67. MacCormick, at 42-43.
68. MacCormick, at 44.
69. cf. I. Johnstone, "Section 7 of the Charter and Constitutionally Protected Welfare" (1988),
46 U.T. Faculty L.R. 1, 4. NB. Johnstone outlines more generally the concept of "liberal
egalitarianism" and the Charter.
70. [1986] 2 S.C.R. 284, at 318-319.
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men over women,. .. and the provision of positive rights to ensure not only
women's equal opportunities,... but their substantive equality .... (my
emphasis) 7'
Thus, it can be said that, while the general approach to the interpretation
of the Charter has been with an emphasis on negative rights, it can also
be said that a stream of thought also exists that the Charter is capable of,
and indeed intended to, also protect positive rights. It has been noted, for
example, that several sections of the Charter already provide for positive
obligations upon the state:
* s.25, in protection of aboriginal rights;
* s. 15(l), in support of the positive right of equal benefit of and access
to social programs,72 and s.15(2), in promotion of the disadvantaged;
* ss. 7-14, in placing a positive obligation on the state to ensure the
right to a fair trial which may include translation;
* s.23, which places a positive burden on the state to provide minority
language training; and,
* s.36(1), which in the Constitution commits governments to the
positive duty of achieving some measure of socio-economic justice.73
If, then, the philosophical foundation of the Charter; while regularly
pointed to as the source of its deficiencies in this regard, is not necessarily
in conflict with a wider interpretation of the Charter, the question remains
whether an explicit widening of its scope by amendment is necessary to
achieve constitutional protection of social and economic rights.
3. The role of the judiciary
Concern is expressed by some that the entrenchment of positive rights in
the Charter, in whatever form, would entail a substantial shift in power
to the courts, and away from the democratic institutions of parliamentary
democracy. Whether areflection of distrust in thejudiciary, an expression
of a theory of democratic accountability or a result of the more practical
consideration of the various degrees of expertise fostered in the different
institutions, certain assumptions are made about the hierarchy and nature
of rights and institutions that are not without weaknesses, and should be
exposed.
The traditional perspective on how rights are interconnected, as Laskin
enunciated it for example, placed certain fundamental liberties atthe apex
of an hierarchy, with other rights such as those pertaining to legal and
71. Clark, supra, note 38; J.S. Mill, "The Subjection of Women."
72. Schachter v. Canada Employment and Immigration Commission et al. (1990), 108 N.R.123 (F.C.A.).
73. Trakman, at 7; Kymlicka & Norman, at 2.
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economic affairs, atpoints below in the hierarchy. Based on this hierarchical
fashioning of the rights discourse, it follows that while the courts can
appropriately play arole in the protection of the highertier of liberties, second
tier liberties are best left to the political process. It is not, however, a given
thatrights are structured in a hierarchy, as opposed to a continuum ora circle,
and the assumption that one institution is Mhore or less capable of applying
certain rights separates human experience artificially. Trakman writes:
When judges treat constitutional rights like liberty and security of the
person as a priori, they make three questionable assumptions: that the
nature of a priori rights is self-evident; that those rights are graduated
according to a discoverable hierarchy, with the Charteratits apex; and that
justice is achieved by the neutral application of those principles to specific
cases. Absent one of these assumptions, the neatly stacked house of cards
comes tumbling down, and the judge must find another way to play the
rights game. 4
For Laskin, the purpose of the distinctions was several fold, but he was
particularly concerned that the conservative, ill-equipped judiciary would
interfere with the legislature's implementation of economic measures
designed to create greater equality, but which necessarily interfered with
the classical protection for freedom of contract and property. 5 In part, as
Colvin suggests, that reluctance to change the domain of the courts is a
function of the "fact" that the judiciary is not sufficiently skilled or
experienced in the kinds of policy issues that are associated with positive
obligations on the state:
Any claims which the judiciary can make to an "inherent domain" must be
claims about means rather than ends. The judiciary should have some
special expertise in matters of institutional process. The judiciary may also
have certain limited powers to review governmental decisions of social
policy. There is, however, no constitutional basis within Westem democratic
tradition for the judiciary to claim any area of substantive policy-making
as its exclusive preserve.76
Yet, the argument that a line exists between policy and law, the latter in
which the judiciary has a role to play, is inconsistent with the kind of
analysis that has become expected by the courts in relation to s.7's
substantive rights and s.1's "political analysis. 77
74. Trakman, at 173.
75. Sharpe, at 637.
76. E. Colvin, "Section Seven of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms" (1989), 68
Can. Bar Rev. 560, 575; quoted with approval by Lamer J. (as he then was), Reference re:
ss.193 & 195,1(1)(c) of the Criminal Code, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1123.
77. Chief Justice Lamer: "...with the Charter we [judges] are commanded, when asked to do
so, to sometimes judge the laws themselves. It is a very different activity, especially when one
is asked to took at section 1 of the Charter, which is asking us to make what is essentially what
used to be a political call," in "How the Charter changes justice" (April 17, 1992), Globe &
Mail, at A17.
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For others, the preference for keeping policy matters out of the
jurisdiction of the courts arises out of a concern about the adverse effects
to public policy foreseen as being the necessary result of a shift in the
control over suchmatters from the protection of an accountable, democratic
process.78 In short, this argument places emphasis upon the role of
parliamentary sovereignty and the importance of avoiding judicial
constraint of the democratic will. Unlike the United Kingdom, however,
Canada's Constitution has included from the beginning constraints upon
the House of Commons, in the form of federalism, restrictions which
were added to by the Charter.79
Furthermore, the implicit belief that it is less democratic to place limits
on parliament in the form of judicial review, assumes that elected,
political institutions are the exclusive domain of democratic values, and
that a separation of parliament and judiciary is severe. Yet, it was the
democratic process that created the Charter, and it is that dialectic
between the bench and elected officials that balances expediency with
perspective. And, in spite of protestations to the contrary,judges participate
in political discourse, and thus cannot hide behind an apolitical facade.8"
With ss. 1 and 33, the principle of parliamentary sovereignty is
preserved, yet each section includes a check on the rule of the majority in
the name of democracy. While the courts will review legislation against
the rights protected in the Charter, these rights will be balanced with
"such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably
justified in a free and democratic society."'" And, while Parliament or a
provincial legislature may pass legislation "notwithstanding a provision
included in s.2 or ss.7 to 15," of the Charter,2 such a declaration is limited
in effect to five-years,8 3thus ensuring some measure of a democratic
check on parliamentary sovereignty.
In addition, the under-representative nature of our bench in Canada,"
often cited as evidence of the problem with placing greater power in the
hands of the courts, is not necessarily more pronounced in relation to
Canadian society than the elected institutions in which some would place
78. Kymlicka & Norman, at 5.
79. P.W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 2nd ed., (Toronto: Carswell, 1985), at 259.




84. Bakan, supra. note 11, at 319, note 32: Office of the Minister of Justice of Canada, 1990,
reports that only 75 of 854 federal court judges were women, (i.e. only 8.8%).
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greater faith. 5 If the objection is to placing too much ofourdecision-making
process in the hands of the unelected, then presumably electing judges
would satisfy that concern, but having every decision go before elected
bodies is not the minimum requirement of democracy. 86 As recent
criticism of our elected officials at all levels of governmenthas illustrated,
being elected is not all that is required to achieve success in policy
matters, in overcoming disparities in the economy, or in determining the
manner in which power is distributed from the center to the periphery.
87
In sum, then, the traditional view that places the judiciary in the role
of discovering a priori rights, leaving policy matters to the elected
parliament, starts from several uncertain premises. It is not necessarily
correct that rights are structured in a hierarchy, nor is it a given that a line
between ends and means further separates the role of the courts from that
of the elected institutions. Therefore, it should not be accepted without
closer scrutiny that a role for the judiciary in the protection of positive
rights is inimical to our system of justice. The contextual nature of rights
and the narrowing of the divide between policy and law have already
caused the judiciary to evolve into aless parochial, more socially-situated
body, and this process is only served by the courts' acceptance of greater
input in the form of extrinsic evidence and intervenors.
4. Canada's Charter development
Briefly, it is worthwhile to note that, over the course of Canada's Charter
development, not only have its philosophical roots been informed by the
principles associated with the entrenchment of social and economic
rights, so has the public debate. The proposition that such rights should
be enshrined is not a new one, although the models have changed and
adapted over time.
In 1943 and 1944, the Throne Speeches in the House of Commons
committed His Majesty's Government to a "Charter of social security for
the whole of Canada."88 It has been suggested that the eventual introduction
of social security in post-war Canada resulted from these commitments.89
A proposed amendment to the 1960 draft Bill ofRights,9° which would
have added the right to a minimum standard of living and social security,
was rejected in the House of Commons. At the time of the Bill of Rights
85. In Nova Scotia, for example, only 2 of 52 NMA's have been women since 1988 (to 1993);
i.e. only 3.8%.
86. Kymlicka & Norman, at 8.
87. Ibid., at9.
88. Axworthy & Trudeau, supra, note 51, at 179.
89. Ibid.
90. The Canadian Bill of Rights, S.C. 1960, c.44.
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debate, law professor Trudeau wrote of the need for economic rights in
an entrenched constitution, arguing that the "consumer has the right to a
share of the total production of society, sufficient to enable him[/her] to
develop his[/herl personality to the fullest extent possible."9'
As Prime Minister, however, Trudeau introduced a constitutional
package that did not include economic rights. It was determined that, for
pragmatic reasons, their introduction would have to come at a later date:
"The guarantee of economic rights is desirable and should be the ultimate
objective of Canada," but after the entrenchment of political, legal,
egalitarian and linguistic rights.92
In 1980, in response to a proposed amendment to the draft Charter,
which would have included Canada's commitment to the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) in the text
explicitly, Justice Minister Jean Chretien spoke against such a change,
stating:
I am waiting soon for an amendment to inscribe in the constitution the
apple pie and the recipe of ma tante Berthe, and I do not think we can put
everything there. It is a constitution so I reject this amendment.93
The amendment failed 22 to 2, in committee.94 A proposal to include "the
enjoyment of property" in the draft was also defeated, first in cdmmittee
and then in the House.95
5. Comparative Review
An overview of constitutional developments in other jurisdictions serves
to illustrate that Canada's consideration of a social charter or entrenched
social rights is not entirely unique, and not without some external
philosophical influences.
In Europe, for example, the European Social Charter96 has been in
place since 1961, coming into force in 1965. In January, 1991, 17 member
states had ratified it, including the U.K., France and Germany. The
enshrined rights include the right to organize, the right to social and
medical assistance, the protection of the family and the rights of migrant
workers. A series of appointed committees are used to enforce the
91. Trudeau, supra, note 46, at 122.
92. P.E. Trudeau, A Canadian Charter of Human Rights (1968), at 27, in R. Robertson, "The
Right to Food: Canada's Broken Covenant" (1989-90), 6 Can. H.R. Yb. 185, 196.
93. Minutes, Proceedings and Evidence of the Special Joint Committee of the Senate and the
House of Commons on the Constitution of Canada, (January 30, 1981), at 65-71.
94. Ibid.
95. January 27, 1981 and April 25, 1981.
96. See Ontario Ministry of the Attorney General, Constitutional Law and Policy Division, The
Protection of Social and Economic Rights: A Comparative Study (September 19, 199 1), at 18.
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Charter, combining the public scrutiny of "experts" with the
"accountability" of Ministers representing the members.97
Although the effectiveness of the various regional charters, such as the
African Charter, the Organization of American States' Convention on
Human Rights - Economic, Social and Cultural (the "San Salvador
Protocol"), and the European Community's Community Charter, may be
questioned, they have been intellectually informative in the debate in
Canada as to whether to enshrine social and economic rights.9 Their
language, structure, enforcement mechanisms and effect are regularly
referred to as illustrations, positive and negative, of the value of enshrined
social and economic rights.
In the United States, the due process jurisprudence involving the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments has led to the recognition of welfare rights,
within the rubric of property rights. In Goldberg v. Kelly (1970), 9
quoting the work of Charles Reich on the "new property,"' u the U.S.
Court held that welfare payments are property interest, within the scope
of the Fifth Amendment, thus people qualified for the benefits had a right
to receive them. Over the course of the subsequent twenty years the U.S.
Court has backed away from the Goldberg position,10' but that retreat may
have been slowed with Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill
(1985),102 in which the Court held that, once the legislature has conferred
a property interest in a social program (here, public employment), it
cannot constitutionally authorize the deprivation of such an interest.
From the Canadian perspective, two points need to be made with
respect to U.S. jurisprudence in the area. First of all, the fact that the U.S.
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments include a right to property has not,
been lost on Canadian judges. In Rafuse v. Hambling, Director of Family
Benefits for the Province of Nova Scotia (1979),103 Chief Justice Cowan
distinguished Goldberg on those very grounds. The case involved the
termination of a single-mother's benefits, without a hearing, on the basis
97. Ibid.
98. cf. Ontario Ministry of the Attorney-General, Constitutional Law & Policy Division, The
Protection of Social and Economic Rights: A Comparative Study (September 19, 1991); and,
Report, Institute of Intergovernmental Relations, Approaches to National Standards in
Federal Systems (September, 1991).
99. 397 U.S. 254.
100. C. A. Reich, "The New Property" (1964), 73 Yale L.J. 733.
101. cf.Board ofRegents v.Roth (1972), 408 U.S. 564; Bishop v. Wood (1976), 426 U.S. 341.
102. 105 S.Ct.1487.
103. 39 N.S.R. (2d) 364.
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of an alleged breach of the Family Benefits Act'04 cohabitation rules.
Cowan C.J. felt compelled to allow the termination to stand, relying upon
the social assistance appeal process for the protection of a beneficiary's
right to a hearing. 05
Secondly, while the inclusion of property rights has been proposed
again in the present round of constitutional negotiations, t 6 the Charter
was drafted explicitly excluding the protection of the enjoyment of
property. Those who hope to see such an amendment usher the U.S.
Goldberg-influenced jurisprudence into Canadian social assistance
litigation should be aware of the mixed-bag that is involved. Generally,
the U.S. courts have at various stages in the doctrine's development
allowed contracts'07 and the legislature'03 to circumscribe the terms of the
property interest created in social benefits. In Sparks, the terms of the
lease, although inconsistent with and exempt from, the Residential
Tenancies Act of Nova Scotia, circumscribed the more modest security
of tenure that a public housing tenant may enjoy. ' 9 And, the recent
Supreme Court of Canada decision in Reference re: Canada Assistance
Plan"0 has served to reaffirm the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty
in "policy" matters, such as social assistance. Thus, the status of Goldberg
is no less uncertain than circumstances in Canada at present.
6. The international obligations and influence
While primarily interpretive tools, the international agreements to which
Canada is a party are also helpful in showing the source of much of our
Charter's language. Some would suggest that treaties be afforded a
greater role in determining the Charter's substantive content,"' and the
Supreme Court of Canada in Re: Public Service Employees Relations
Act"12 has stated that international treaties are "relevant and persuasive,"
presumably providing protection at least as great as the international
agreements to which Canada is a party.
104. S.N.S. 1977, c.8, ss. 5 and 6.
105. cf. Re: Webb and Ontario Housing Corporation (1978), 22 O.R0, (2d) 257 (Ont.C.A.),
distinguished.
106. Joint Parliamentary Committee on the Renewal of Canada, infra., p.34 .
107. Board of Regents v. Roth (1974), 408 U.S. 564.
108. Bishop v. Wood (1976), 426 U.S. 341.
109. Sparks, at 7, 8.
110. Supra, note 12.
111. cf. Robertson, supranote 23, where it is argued that Canada has an obligation at
international customary law, implemented by the Charter, to ensure that Canadians have
adequate food.
112. [1987] 1 S.C.R. 313, per Dickson C.J. (as he then was).
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The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights" 3 has been
interpreted as providing social and economic rights through the indirect
protection of civil and political rights." 4 With respect to Canada, the
Charter's 1980 draft included in the explanatory notes to ss. 7-14
reference to the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights."5 And, when
asked, the Minister of Justice of the day stated thatinternational obligations
should be reflected in the Charter."6 Thus, it is argued that s.7 of the
Charter should be interpreted as indirectly protecting economic and
social rights, by virtue of these international influences and obligations.
On the other hand, it has been held in MacDonald v. Vapourn7 that
Parliament must expressly indicate their intentions to implement an
international treaty with national legislation for the courts to so interpret
a statute.
While Hogg has noted that the presumption against a statute being in
violation of an international obligation ensures that these various treaties
remain helpful for interpretive purposes, 1" a view supported by the
courts," 9 the origins of Charter language have at times found its source
in international treaties,'2 0 and the content of the rights has been informed
by international obligations.'2'
The concept of a social charter, the positive protection of social and
economic rights entrenched in the constitution, is not necessarily
inconsistent with Canada's Charter, its philosophical, domestic and
international origins. It is useful to note, as well, that Canada is not alone
in its consideration of these rights and the means appropriate for their
achievement. A social charter would not be a revolutionary break from
the liberal democratic traditions of Canada, nor would it be an entirely
unique development, as illustrated by other jurisdictions.
113. Signed 1966, Annex to G.A. Res. 2200A, 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (no. 16) 52, U.N. Doe.
A/6316, (1966).
114. The U.N. Human Rights Committee which studies and reports on complaints under the
Covenant, held that the Netherlands were in violation of the Covenant when they excluded a
person from social security benefits. Ministry of the Attorney-General, Ontario, supra.,note
19, at 38.
115. M.A. Hayward, "International Law and the Interpretation of the Charter Uses and
Justification" (1984), 23 U.W.O.L.J. 9.
116. Jackman, supra, note 42, at 284.
117. MacDonald v. Vapour Canada Ltd. et al. (1976), 66 D.L.R. (3d) 1,31.
118. Hogg, supra, note 79, at 662..
119. cf. Re; Mitchell and the Queen (1983), 42 O.R. (2d) 481 (H.C.J).
120. cf.R v. Oakes (1983), 40 O.R.(2d) 660 (Ont.C.A.), re: s.11(d) of Charter and similar
language in Article 6(2) of European Covenant, as noted in M.A. Hayward, "International Law
and the Interpretation of the Charter: Uses and Justifications" (1984), 23 U.W.O.L.R. 9.
121. Slaight Communications Inc. v. Davidson, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1038.
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IV. To Liberate Social & Economic Rights
The traditional view has been that the Charter "does not concern itself
with economic rights,' 122 except possibly ss.6(2)(b) and 6(4). From the
Charter's earliest days, academics have argued that social assistance
benefits are protected, 12 yet there have been few "anti-poverty ...
precedents to date." 24
The Charter, as is often repeated, should not be interpreted narrowly,12s
not in a legalistic way which narrows the scope of the rights protected, but
generously.' 26The"purposive" approach to the right or freedom enunciated
in the Charter ensures that the full benefit of the Charter's protection may
be secured. 27 It has been stated by the Supreme Court of Canada that the
purpose of the Charter, and therefore the meaning of which interpretation
should seek to give to the rights and freedoms enunciated therein, must
be contextual 28 and must be guided by the "values and principles
essential to a free and democratic society."' 29 In Oakes, former Chief
Justice Dickson stated that these values and principles include:
• .. respect for the inherent dignity of the human person, commitment to
social justice and equality, accommodation of a wide variety of beliefs,
respect for cultural and group identity, and faith in social and political
institutions which enhance the participation of individuals and groups in
society.(my emphasis)'
As outlined above, the philosophical, historical, and international
context of the Charter is not necessarily antithetical to the protection of
social and economic rights. Yet, also as noted, the courts have not been
anxious to interpret the rights and freedoms in the Charter as including
in their scope those which have been labelled entirely economic,'
122. Re: PublicServiceEmployeesRelationsAct, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 313,412,perMcIntyreJ (as
he then was).
123. cf. A. Wayne MacKay & M. Holgate, "Fairness in the Allocation of Public Housing:
Economic & Legal Aspects," (1983), 7 Dal.L.J. 383.
124. "B.C. welfare recipients protected by Charter s. 15, may challenge statute" (July 5, 1991),
11 Lawyers Weekly #10.
125. Law Society of Upper Canada v. Skapinker, [ 1984] 1 S.C.R. 357.
126. Hunter v. Southam, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145.
127. R. v. Big MDrug Mart, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295, 334, per Dickson C.J. (as he then was).
128. Ibid., at 344: meaning the historical setting, the language chosen to articulate the right
itself, the larger objects of the Charter itself, other rights associated within the text.
129. R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103, 136, per Dickson C.J. (as he then was).
130. Ibid.
131. RVP Enterprises Ltd. v. British Columbia (Minister of Consumer & Corporate Affairs),
[1988] 4 W.W.R. 726 (B.C.C.A.), 733.
590 The Dalhousie Law Journal
"purely economic,' 132 proprietary, 133 "merely pecuniary,"'3 4 or "general
public policy dealing with broader social, political and moral issues."'
13
In approaching the need for a social "C", 136 it is worthwhile to
appreciate, however, that the doorto the Charter's protection of subsistence
economic and social rights has been explicitly left open by the Supreme
Court of Canada. The "living tree" approach to the evolving role and
growing scope of the Charter would suggest that this slight opening will
be, in the right fact situation, helpful in eventually extending Charter
protection to basic needs related social and economic rights.
While the application of s.7, in this regard, may still be limited, ss.15
and 24 have recently been applied with some success to protect the rights
of benefits recipients. In addition, s.1 would appear to be supportive of the
widening of the contextualization of Charter rights. With respect to
national programs such as the Canada Assistance Plan and the
Unemployment Insurance Act, the security and rights of recipients have
been shielded, to some extent, but once again the courts have walked very
carefully the line between parliamentary sovereignty and the role of the
judiciary.
Thus, the question before proponents of a social "C" must be, simply
stated, as follows: to what extent is the Charter's language deficient in
regard to the protection of basic needs related social and economic rights?
And, to that extent, what amendments or additions to the Charter and/or
Constitution are necessary? desired?
1. S.7 of the Charter
The courts have been "virtually unanimous in holding that the provision
or denial of social benefits does not implicate s.7. ' 1137 It is important to
appreciate, however, that, while this point may be true, it is also true that
a path has been cleared by the courts to allow, in certain restricted cases,
s.7 to be considered for the protection of basic needs.
The majority of cases dealing with s.7 and economic rights, within the
rubric of "liberty" or "security of the person" protection, have been with
respect to what may be labelled generally as commercial matters. For
132. Whitbread v. Walley (1988), 26 B.C.L.R. (2d) 203 (CA), at 213.
133. Wilson v. Medical Service Commission (1988), 30 B.C.L.R. (2d) 1, at 18.
134. Reference re: Public Service Employee Relations Act (Alta.), Dickson C.J. (as he then
was), dissenting at 368.
135. Reference re: ss. 193 & 195.1(1)(c) of the Criminal Code, per Lamner J. (as he then was).
136. covenant or charter or contract
137. I. Morrison, "Poverty Law and the Charter: The Year in Review" (1989), 6 J.L & Soc.
Pol'y 1, 18.
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example, the courts have said that, regarding Sunday closing laws
effecting retail stores, s.7 "is not synonymous with unconstrained freedom,"
and cannot be regarded as protecting an "unconstrained right to transact
business whenever one wishes.""13
On licensing of liquor-related matters, the court determined that,
"'liberty' does not generally extend to commercial or economic
interests."139 Or, with respect to the regulation of securities, the B.C. court
held that being prevented from trading securities, a "purely economic"
matter, is not a consequence which has application to s.7. 140
A matter which may be encompassed within the term "property", or an
economic matter which may be seen as raising a right to the free
enjoyment of a proprietary interest, has been explicitly barred from the
protection of s.7 on the grounds that, unlike the U.S. Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendment, "property" was intentionally excluded from the final version
of s.7 in the Charter.141
In my view, one cannot import the concept of right to property as expressed
in the American Constitution into s.7 of our Charter for the obvious reason
that the "property" provision was never enacted in Canada. What we have
in Canada in the place of the words "property, without due process of law"
is "security of the person."' 42
It is interesting to note that in his pre-Charter discussions of economic
rights, rights of which he did not favour the courts' protection, Laskin
focused on his concern that rights to property or unregulated economic
activity would infringe upon affirmative efforts by the state to "promote
equality":
[Laskin] recognized that judicial intervention which would override
affirmative and progressive legislative measures in the name of economic
liberty would infringe the economic liberties of those who needed help.'43
Similarly, the courts have resisted the temptation to interpret s.7 as
protecting economic rights, apparently fearing its use for the promotion
of laissez-faire business activity. It is ironic, therefore, that those seeking
economic fairness in the Charterhave been largely unsuccessful because
of that reluctance to open the "pandora's box" that is economic rights, or
138. R. v. Edwards Books, [1986] 2 SCR 713,785-786.
139. Reference re: ss.193 and 195.1(1)(c) of the Criminal Code, [1990], Laner J. (as he then
was) on the decision in RVP Enterprises Ltd v. B.C. (Minister of Consumer & Corporate
Affairs), [1988], supra, note 13.
140. Bennett v. B.C.(Securities Commission), (1991) 82 D.L.R. (4th) 129, 181 (B.C.S.C.).
141. cf. A.G. Quebec v. Irwin Toy Limited, et al., [1989] 1 SCR 927; Fisherman's Wharf
(1982), N.B.C.A., per LaForest J.A. (as he then was).
142. R. v. Robson (1985), 19 D.L.R. (4th) 112, 114 (B.C.C.A.), per Nemetz C.J.
143. Sharpe, at 636.
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more precisely to distinguish between commercial economic rights and
subsistence economic rights, as Laskinhad conceptually in thepre-Charter
era. To be fair, the Supreme Court has recently attempted to make a
distinction between commercial economic rights, which are viewed as
being excluded from Charter protection, and the right to economic
fairness, which may yet have the protection of s.7.144
The line of reasoning which fails to make that distinction has had some
impact on cases which raise the question of whether a right to economic
fairness exists, as was seen in the Sparks decision. In Bernard v.
Dartmouth Housing Authority (1988),145 one of the cases Palmeter C.J.
relies upon in Sparks, the determination that subsidized housing was "a
proprietary [right] which bestowed direct economic benefit on the
appellant,1 46 allowed a single-mother and her children to be removed for
a violation of an occupancy regulation. Palmeter C.J. in Sparks paraphrased
with approval Bernard as follows:
The Appeal Division held that because the right asserted was a proprietary
one, which bestowed a direct benefit to the tenant, it had no constitutional
protection under s. 7 of the Charter .... To summarize, Bernard is the law
in Nova Scotia as it relates to distinctions created by the Residential
Tenancies Act affecting tenants of public housing.'147
In Brown v. B.C. (Minister ofHealth) (1990),148 an action by gay and
bisexual men who were AIDS patients to have the drug AZT covered by
the provincial health plan was dismissed on the grounds that at issue there
was "economic deprivation." As the question involved was whether an
expense associated with the purchase of drugs would be compensated for
by the health plan, it was therefore a matter involving the enhancement
of one's economic circumstances, and thus beyond the scope of s.7:
I find that their claim under s.7 of the Charter rests on economic
deprivation. I have found that Mr. Mann, the late Kevin Brown, and others
like them in the same economic situation, to pay $2000 from a limited
income, works economic hardship. In order to pay it, they must make
sacrifices in their life-style. But a reduction in the standard of living is not
a deprivation contemplated by s. 7 of the Charter.'49
Nevertheless, it is important to illustrate that the Supreme Court has
not closed the door to the application of s.7 as contemplated inDartmouth
144. A.G. Quebec v. Irwin Toy Limited et al., [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927.
145. 88 .N.S.R (2d) 190 (N.S.S.C.A.D.).
146. Ibid.
147. Sparks, at 16, 32.
148.66 D.L.R. (4th) 444 (B.C.S.C.).
149. Ibid., at 467.
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or Brown. In Singh v. MEIC,50 Justice Wilson clarified that each of the
elements of the s.7, namely "life, liberty and security of the person, are
independent interests, each of which must be given independent
significance by the Court." '' This interpretation has since been adopted
in Re: B.C. Motor Vehicle Act by Lamer J.,152 and Chief Justice Dickson
in Morgentaler. With respect to "security of the person," Wilson J.
included in Singh the Law Reform Commission's proposed expansive
definition, but found it unnecessary to adopt for the purposes of the case
before her. The Law Reform Commission proposed that,
"security" of the person means not only protection of one's physical
integrity, but the provision of necessaries for its support.'53
In Irwin Toy, the majority expressly determined that the court was not
deciding the status of the kind of interpretation of s.7 referred to by
Wilson J. in Singh:
This [the general inference that economic rights are not within the
parameters of s.7] is not to declare, however, that no right with an
economic component can fall within "security of the person." Lower
courts have found that the rubric of "economic rights" embraces a broad
spectrum of interests, ranging from such rights, included in international
covenants, as rights to social security, equal pay for equal work, adequate
food, clothing and shelter, to traditional property - contract rights. To
exclude all of these at this early moment in the history of the Charter
interpretation seems to us to be precipitous. We do not, at this time, choose
to pronounce upon whether those economic rights fundamental to human
life or survival are to be treated as though they are of the same ilk as
corporate-commercial rights. (my emphasis) 54
More recently, in Reference re: ss. 193 & 195.1(1)(c) of the Criminal
Code,"'55 Lamer J. did not widen the path through which such a matter
might access s.7, but neither did he shut the gate to the inclusion of
fundamental subsistence rights. The majority held that in this case s.7
does not extend to protect one's right to exercise a chosen profession,
specifically here prostitution. Leading up to this conclusion, Lamer J.
provides an analysis of the s.7 economic rights cases and, in mostly obiter
comments, points the direction for future administrative law cases on
150. [1985] 1 S.C.R. 177, per Wilson J.
151. Ibid., at 205.
152. [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486, at 500.
153. Law Reform Commission of Canada,Medical Treatment and the CriminalLaw (Working
Paper #26) (Ottawa: Supply & Services, 1980), at 7, in P. Garant, "Fundamental Rights and
Fundamental Justice," G. Beaudoin & E. Ratushny, eds., Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms, 2d ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1989), at 345.
154. Irwin Toy, supra, note 144.
155. Supra, note 13.
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social security matters to access s.7 liberty and security of the person
protection.
At the core of his analysis are two points: first of all, Lamer J. regards
s.7, as part of the "Legal Rights" section of the Charter, as being related
to fundamental justice or the justice system, thereby being partly defined
by the ss.8-14 rights. As such, he finds that s.7 interests are those which
are "properly and traditionally within the domain of the judiciary," such
as the ss.8-14 negative rights which protect the individual from the state.
He concludes:
Therefore, the restrictions on liberty and security of the person that s.7 is
concerned with are those that occur as aresult of an individual's interaction
with the justice system, and its administration. 156
Secondly, he indicates that he does not necessarily agree with the
distinction between a proposed s.7 right to pursue a livelihood or
profession as found in Wilson v. MedicalServices Commission (1988),117
and the economic right termed the "right to work," which has been
consistently excluded from s.7 on the grounds that it is analogous to
property rights. In doing so, Lamer I. appears to be raising doubts about
the acceptance by the Supreme Court of such a splitting of hairs:
... it seems to me that the distinction sought to be drawn by the court
between the right to work and a right to pursue a profession is, with respect,
not one that aids in an understanding of the scope of "liberty" under s.7 of
the Charter."8
There are a number of questions that the ruling raises, the answers of
which may help to clarify the nature of the opening allowed by the
decision. First of all, Lamer J. explicitly excludes from s.7 protection that
which is not an "essential element of the administration ofjustice," public
policy on matters of social significance for example. He also, however,
allows for the possibility that matters, such as social welfare, which are
regulated by administrative bodies, might appropriately require judicial
review on questions of procedural and substantive fairness. What is not
clear from this very subtle, if not illusory distinction, is which social
programs Lamer J. has in mind which do not, in some way, find
themselves administered by bodies that are governed by the rules of
fundamental justice. Presumably, if the program provides assistance to
those in need, a delivery system will be in place to administer it.'59 And,
156. Reference re: ss.193 & 195.1(1)(c), at (6-196).
157.30 B.C.L.R. (2d) 1 (B.C.C.A.).
158. Reference re: ss.193 & 195.1(1)(c), at (6-195).
159. cf. Report of the Social Assistance Review Committee ("The Thomson Report"),
Transitions (Ontario Ministry of Community and Social Services, 1988), for a detailed look
at the administration of social assistance services in Ontario, with some consideration of other
jurisdictions.
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therefore, a decision to deny benefits, likely to cause psychological harm,
stress, anxiety and economic uncertainty, 60 a breach of a one's right to
security of the person,' 6' would not be permissible except in accordance
with the principles of fundamental justice.
Secondly, although one of the earliest of Charter decisions, Skapinker,
determined that not too much should be made of the title of sections of the
document, other than to provide some interpretive guidance, the "Legal
Rights" title seems to be given a great deal of weight by Lamer J. in his
classification of s.7 as being "concerned with the justice system, and its
administration." Lamer J. states:
It is significant that the rights guaranteed by s.7 as well as those guaranteed
by ss.8-14 are listed under the title "Legal Rights"... .The use of the term
"Legal Rights" suggests a distinctive set of rights different from the rights
guaranteed by other sections of the Charter.161
Thus, it is following this logic that he finds a role for the courts, as the
"guardian of the administration of justice," in the assessment of the use
of punitive measures in cases of non-compliance with administrative
regulation, for example, which impact upon the physical liberty and
security of the person of the individual. One wonders, then, if almost
immediate eviction from public housing as a penalty for non-compliance
with a regulation, as occurred in Bernard and Sparks, would trigger the
rights in s.7, to implicate the courts in the determination of whether that
restriction of an individual's security of the person interests was in
accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.
Thirdly, Lamer J. accepts the view that the "proper judicial role" does
not include the review of matters which are labelled "social policy." He
does so, however, without providing a clarification of what distinguishes
social policy from, for example, environmental policy, in spite of the
prevailing view that policy fields are less and less distinguishable and far
more complimentary than they were thought to be in the past. As well, he
accepts without debate the implicit conclusion that judges are somehow
less capable of dealing with social policy than other matters, although he
does not explain what test of "expertise" should be applied to matters
before we allow our judiciary to review disputes that arise in relation to
them. It is ironic, therefore, that Lamer C.J. has recently sided with the
more interventionist majority, in cases assessing the jurisdiction of
administrative tribunals, despite the explicit will of the legislatures to
160. Thomson Report, at 512, 513.
161. Mills v. The Queen, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 863, aff'd in Carter v. The Queen, [1986] 1 S.C.R.
981.
162. Reference re: ss.193 & 195.1(1)(c), at (6-196).
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delegate the policy field in question to a tribunal of experts and to protect
that delegation with a privative clause in the respective statutes.'63
Former Justice Bertha Wilson recently admitted that she found the
concepts of judicial deference to the legislatures and judicial review an
"ill-matched pair," which are potentially weakening the Charter and
"muddying... the jurisprudential waters."164 This dichotomy has been the
source of a great deal of academic thought over the life of the Charter,
and, as Lamer J.'s reluctance illustrated, has informed the courts' careful
application of s.7 rights to economic matters.
In an early consideration of the Charter, John Whyte concluded that
economic interests vital to one's autonomy had to be covered by s.7, and
the determination by the state that these interests were less important than
others is the kind that the Charter was intended to "place beyond state
power":
... the phrase "security of the person" connotes the notion of interests
central to personal integrity. Economic interests can, in many circumstances,
be seen as indispensable to the dignity and integrity of individuals and the
capacity of individuals to pursue their own ideas of the good life. 6'
On the other hand, Wayne MacKay took an approach to this question
of the appropriate scope of s.7 which, similar to that of Laskin's
pre-Charter suspicion of the conservativejudiciary, 166placed an emphasis
on the courts' institutional limits in expertise, ideology, and utility.167
MacKay notes the success of women's groups in lobbying for ss. 15 and
28 protection under the Charter, whereas the outcome in theA.G. Canada
v. Lavall 61 reflected the more classic judicial conservativism on such
issues. 169 Of course, the Supreme Court ruling in Morgentaler, which
occurred after MacKay's article, provides an illustration of the court
being the more progressive of the two institutions. The decision inSparks
is more in line with MacKay's point, however, in that the court was
unwilling to move beyond the strict interpretation of the legislation, in
spite of the recognition in most other provinces that such limited security
of tenure provisions for public housing tenants is unconscionable. 170
163. cf. W.W. Lester (1978) Ltd. v. U.A., Local 740 (1990), 48 Admin.L.R. 1, per McLachlin
J.; Canada (A.G.) v. P.SA.C. (1991), 48 Admin. L.R. 161, perSopinkaJ. Also cf. C.A. Taylor,
"Curial Deference and Judicial Review" (1991), 13 Advocates Q. 78.
164. "Weakening Charter protection feared" (April 16, 1992), Globe & Mail.
165. J. Whyte, "Fundamental Justice: The Scope and Application of Section 7 of the Charter"
(1983), 13 Man. L.J. 455,475.
166. Cf. Sharpe, supra, note 47.
167. A. Wayne MacKay, "Fairness After the Charter" (1985), 10 Queen's L.J. 236,296-302,
(hereinafter "MacKay").
168. [1974] SCR 1349.
169. MacKay, at 298.
170. Sparks, at 30-3 1.
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In Reference re: ss. 193 & 195.1 (1)(c), 7 ' Lamer J. quotes approvingly
the argument for a narrowing of the application of s.7 provided recently
by Eric Colvin. Also concerned, as was MacKay, with the relative
expertise of the judiciary on policy matters, Colvin provides a rationale
for the distinguishing between ends and means:
"section 7 is concerned with legal means rather than social ends, with the
processes by which social objectives are pursued rather than with the
justice of the ends which are sought. 17 2
Nevertheless, Colvin also sees, as did Whyte, legitimacy in the argument
that s.7 may cover the denial or withdrawal of state benefits, which form
a "part of a scheme for ensuring that people can exercise all their
capacities as human beings":
... there is force to the argument that the denial or withdrawal of some state
benefits can be so physically dangerous or psychologically traumatizing
as to create a deprivation of security of the person."'
Thus, if we apply the test which appears to have emerged with respect
to the withdrawal of state benefits to the situation faced by Ms. Sparks,
it becomes apparent that Chief Justice Palmeter's reliance in Sparks upon
Bernard may be tenuous in light of the developments since. Briefly
stated, the test as to whether s.7 is triggered with respect to social
assistance may be as follows:
1. Is the matter at issue one of economic subsistence, and not a matter
of commercial economic freedom? (Irwin Toy)
2. Are the state benefits in question a part of a scheme designed to
ensure a degree of economic fairness such that people may exercise all
their capacities as human beings, as a condition of self-respect and the
pursuit of contentment? (Colvin and MacCormick)
3. Are the state benefits delivered by an administrative body, with
control over decisions affecting an individual's physical liberty and/or
security of the person?
4. Has the use of punitive measures, broadly speaking, by this
administrative agency been applied for non-compliance with aregulation?
(Reference re: ss. 193 & 195.1(1)(c))
5. Can it be said that the effect of this punitive measure has been to
cause psychological harm, stress, anxiety and economic uncertainty?
(Mills, per the argument of the "Thomson Report" and Colvin)
171. Supra, note 13.
172. E. Colvin, "Section Seven of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms" (1989), 68
Can. Bar Rev. 560, 561.
173. Colvin, at 584.
598 The Dalhousie Law Journal
In relation to Ms. Sparks, the argument would be that her eligibility and
need for public housing is a function of her economic situation, therefore
measures affecting her access to affordable housing are matters related to
economic subsistence. The availability of public housing, at
rent-geared-to-income may be said to be, broadly speaking, part of a
scheme which includes provincial social assistance intended to ensure
that Ms. Sparks and her children are able to exercise the degree of
economic freedom and housing security necessary for the satisfaction of
other conditions of self-respect and the pursuit of contentment. The
Dartmouth/Halifax Housing Authority is an administrative agency,
delivering the public housing program, under the provincial legislation.
Almost immediate eviction, upon only a month's notice, after ten years
of tenancy, can be said to be nothing other than punitive. In light of the
high cost of housing and the relatively difficult time people inMs. Sparks'
situation have finding affordable accommodation, as Palmeter C.J.
acknowledges, 74 the effect of eviction without sufficient time to search
for alternative accommodation, must be psychologically harmful to Ms.
Sparks and her two children. The ability of the administrative agency to
,use such a punitive measure likely creates anxiety amongst the other
residents of public housing.
In sum, then, in spite of Bernard, recent developments in the
interpretation of s.7 could trigger the section's protection such that it
applied to the circumstances of the Sparks case. The withdrawal of Ms.
Sparks benefits, that is her eviction from public housing, should be
permitted, therefore, only in accordance with the principles of fundamental
justice.
2. Section 15
In the recent decision of the B.C. Supreme Court, FederatedAnti-Poverty
Groups ofB.C. v. Attorney-General ofB.C., 175 a significant development
of the "analogous grounds" test in Andrews v. Law Society ofB.C. 176 was
provided, giving way to the possibility of protection for welfare recipients
under s. 15. While the ruling in Sparks appears to have been influenced by
the FAPG (BC) decision, such that it was held that social assistance
recipients are a discrete and insular minority protected by s.15 of the
Charter, Chief Justice Palmeter's application of the tests for direct and
adverse impact discrimination unfortunately illustrates the underlying
174. Sparks, at p.10.
175. (1991), Vancouver Registry # A893060 (B.C.S.C.) [unreported], [hereinafter F.A.P.G.
(B.C.)].
176. (1987), 56 D.L.R. (4th) 193 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter Andrews].
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weaknesses that continue to prevent the Charter from growing to protect
the rights of those in economic need. As Morrison noted, regarding the
s. 15 jurisprudence before FAPG (BC):
... success in equality litigation in this area is at least temporarily stalled.
.. These cases [the first after Andrews] show that there are still major
doctrinal and ideological barriers to equality arguments in relation to
exclusion from social welfare schemes. 177
Not insignificantly, Palmeter C.J. does find that social assistance
recipients are an "analogous group," '78 as defined by Andrews, and
applied in FAPG (BC). In FAPG (BC), Parrett J. concluded as follows:
Applying the test under s.15 of the Charter, it is clear that persons
receiving income assistance constitute a discrete and insular minority
within the meaning of s.15. It may be reasonably inferred that because
recipients of public assistance generally lack substantial political influence,
they comprise "those groups in society whose needs and wishes elected
officials have no apparent interest in attending."' 79
Palmeter C.J. determines, in coming to the same conclusion as Parrett J.
in FAPG (BC), that social assistance recipients, who are Black and
single-parent women living in public housing, share several noteworthy
characteristics:
1. That women, Blacks and social assistance recipients form a
disproportionately large number of tenants in public housing.
2. That women, Blacks and social assistance recipients form a
disproportionate number of the people on the waiting list for public
housing .... I accept that single-parent families have a more difficult time
economically. The same is true regarding housing for single-parent
mothers. Material submitted... convince me that single-parent mothers
have a more difficult time securing appropriate housing....
One can almost take judicial notice that the Black community in Nova
Scotia has always been at the low end of the economic scale. The material
submitted corroborates this submission. Percapita, the income and education
of Black Nova Scotians are considerably lower than the majority of other
Nova Scotians. Employment opportunities and availability of suitable
housing also are not equivalent.
I accept the submissions by the tenant that single-parent mothers, Blacks
are less advantaged than the majority of other members of our society. It
also goes without saying that social assistance recipients are also less
advantaged.... [my emphasis] 180
177. Morrison, at 22.
178. Sparks, at 9.
179. FAPG (BC), at 29-30 of unreported decision, as in Ellsworth and Morrison, supra, note
17, at 20.
180. Sparks, at 5,6,10,11.
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Thus, it is surprising when Palmeter C.J. concludes that the tenant in
Sparks, who had been evicted from public housing with only one month's
notice compared with three months for private housing tenants, had not
established a prima facie case of direct or adverse impact discrimination.
Palmeter C.J. concluded that she had not shown a "connection between
the characteristics of the sex, or the race, or the source of income, and the
different treatment," nor an imposition of a"special obligation... because
of some special characteristic of the group.
181
In applying the Andrews test for direct discrimination, Palmeter C.J.
relies a great deal upon the pre-Andrews Nova Scotia Appeal Division
judgement in Bernard. It is important to note, however, that with
Andrews, and the later applications of the Andrews approach in R. v.
Turpin,182 the Supreme Court added substance to its approach to
discrimination. Palmeter C.J. is content to conclude:
... Bernard is the law in Nova Scotia as it relates to distinctions created
in the Residential Tenancies Act affecting tenants in public housing.
Distinctions, differences or inequality do not necessarily give rise to
discrimination.([my emphasis]) 83
Palmeter C.J. further states that it must be established, according to
Andrews, that the distinction in the law must be "based on the personal
characteristic of the individual or the group,"'184 in order for the distinction
to constitute discrimination.
If, however, the purpose of the distinction is considered closely, one
can find the connection that Palmeter C.J. requires. As is noted in the
judgement, public housing is created to help "relieve the burden of
poverty to which [public housing tenants] are subject as a result of their
financial status."'8" Also in the judgement, it is outlined that the
characteristics of the groups who disproportionately comprise the public
housing tenancies include those necessary for a finding that they are an
"analogous group," pursuant to Andrews. As clarified by Wilson J. in
Turpin, and quoted with approval in R. v. S. (G.) by Dickson C.J., 86 the
second stage of theAndrews inquiry, into the connection of the distinction
with a personal characteristic of the discrete and insular minority,
requires consideration of whether "indicia of discrimination such as
stereotyping, historical disadvantage or vulnerability to political and
181. Sparks, at 26-27.
182. (1989), 69 C.R. (3d) 97 (SCC) [hereinafter Turpin].
183. Sparks, at 32.
184. Sparks, at 28.
185. Sparks, at 14.
186. [1990] S.C.C., [unreported decision of March 23, 1990].
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social prejudice,"' 87 relevant to the characteristic may be discovered in
the distinction. Thus, if the exemption for public housing tenants, who are
disproportionately members of analogous groups, can be shown to have
resulted from historical stereotyping and vulnerability to social and
political prejudice, then the necessary connection will have been made to
constitute discrimination. Palmeter C.J. notes the purpose of the distinction
to be "administrative flexibility," as found in Bernard:
The purpose of the impugned legislation is to provide the landlord the
administrative flexibility to administer the scheme and adapt it to the
various changing circumstances peculiar to subsidized housing. Changes
in eligibility and personal and family circumstances such as income,
number of occupants, and a variety of other changes may affect the rental
charges as well as the duration of the tenancy.'
Furthermore, Palmeter C.J. cites the argument in Newfoundland &
Labrador Housing Corp. v. Williams et al.189 that the distinction, which
provides for particular exemptions with regard to rent increases and
termination notices "because entitlement to subsidization may vary with
respect to a tenant as time passes," is a "bland inequality" which is in the
acceptable "range within which the political regime may operate with
impunity.' 190
Relevant characteristics of the exemptions, therefore, emerge. The
fact that the regime of public housing is rent-geared-to-income has been
provided as ajustification for more "flexible" security of tenure provisions,
and in doing so the historical social prejudices and stereotyping that
inform social assistance policy is given legitimacy. More specifically, the
underlying assumption of the argument is that there is provided a special
benefit with public housing which cannot be expected to satisfy in its
provision the standards to which private landlords must comply. Or, as
Palmeter himself states in Sparks:
• ..although some arguments could be made that there are certain
advantages accruing to such recipients if they are able to obtain suitable
public housing at a smaller percentage of their income than would be the
case if they were a private sector tenant.'9'
Palmeter C.J. adds to this perception when he states that the shorter notice
period and the exemption from the security of tenure provision could be
a benefit to those on the waiting list for public housing.
187. R. v. S. (G.), at 1332-33.
188. Bernard, at 198, quoted with approval in Sparks, at 17.
189. (1989), 62 Nfld. & P.E.I. E.I.R. 269 (Nfld. C.A.), [hereinafter Williams].
190. Williams, at 277-278.
191. Sparks, at 11.
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In other words, as pointed out in the Thomson Report, it is a not
uncommon perception that those receiving social assistance prefere it to
being self-sufficient, and therefore stay on social assistance or in public
housing until they are removed from the programs by benevolent
administrators. As the Thomson Report goes on to point out, however,
these are indeed biases and not reality, as the contrary to both assumptions
has been illustrated by numerous studies. 92
In addition, the common categorization of the two policies, namely the
rent-geared-to-income provision and the exemption from security of
tenure, is illogical, and only serves to prevent a closer assessment of the
more problematic of the two. While the very nature of public housing
requires a separate rental regime, in order to satisfy the programme's
affordable housing objectives, it does not follow that a similar distinction
with respect to security of tenure is necessary. Any of the listed changes
in circumstances that would require a reassessment of an individual's
eligibility for public housing can be done under a needs testing policy,
which could itself be a justification for special exemption from the
security of tenure provision. It is not required that administrators have a
blanket exemption, as most of the other provinces have shown with the
removal of such provisions from their statutes. 93
Further evidence of the source of the legislation and the biases
associated with public policy affecting Canada's poor is necessary to
support this conclusion. For the purposes of this paper, however, the
intention is to illustrate that a more substantive analysis of the purpose
and effect of the distinction, as well as the more diligent application of the
Andrews approach to discrimination, may be able to support an argument
that s. 15 of the Charter is infringed by the security of tenure provision of
the Residential Tenancies Act of Nova Scotia. Palmeter C.J. admits, on
the other hand, that he does not find it appropriate to "second guess the
legislature and the decision of the court in Bernard."'94
It may be argued, however, that a connection between the distinction
and the personal characteristics of the groups does, in fact, exist, as an
Andrews approach would appear to illustrate: the exemption finds its
purpose in biases which are held with respect to public housing's
disproportionately largepopulationofeconomically disadvantagedpeople.
In finding that connection, according to Palmeter's C.J.'s conclusions,
the provision would be classified as discriminatory and could only be
saved by s.1 of the Charter.
192. Thomson Report, at 13, 32.
193.Sparks, at 31.
194. Ibid.
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Additionally, the adverse impact test from Re: Ontario Human Rights
Commission and Simpson Sears Ltd. 191 also could be more helpful to a
finding of discrimination than would Palmeter C.J.'s decision in Sparks
otherwise indicate. Particularly after finding that the groups to which Ms.
Sparks belongs have special characteristics associated with disadvantages,
sufficient to conclude that social assistant recipients constitute an
"analogous group," one Would expect that the security of tenure exemption
in the Nova Scotia statute would constitute a special imposition of a
penalty, disadvantage or obligation particular tohergroup's characteristics.
As O'Malley established, and Palmeter C.J. quotes approvingly in
Sparks:
.. there is a concept of adverse effect discrimination. It arises where an
employer for genuine business reasons adopts a rule or standard which is
on its face neutral, and which will apply equally to all employees, but
which has a discriminatory effect upon a prohibited ground on one
employee or group of employees in that it imposes, because of some
special characteristic of the employee or group, obligations, penalties, or
restrictive conditions not imposed on other members of the work force. 196
Palmeter C.J. paraphrases the test as follows:
.. the tenant must establish that a requirement which is otherwise neutral
is imposed and applies to everyone upon whom it is imposed, imposes
special obligations on some because of some special characteristics of the
group.' 97
In his judgement, however, Palmeter C.J. does not really consider the
adverse impact of the otherwise neutral exemption of public housing
from security of tenure provisions upon the relevant groups. Instead, the
judgement merely concludes that the tenant's submission that
disproportionate affect upon an enumerated or analogous group is not
sufficient for adverse impact discrimination to be found:
I agree that a proponent of discrimination must prove disproportionality
but must also prove that the distinction is based on the personal
characteristics of the individual or group.'98
With respect, this would appear to be a misstatement of the test of
adverse impact discrimination, in that it demands that the purpose of the
distinction in question be based on the relevant characteristic, as is
required with direct discrimination. Whereas, it is the very goal of the
adverse impact test to get beyond the purpose of the distinction and assess
195. (1985), 23 D.L.R. (4th) 321 [hereinafter O'Malley].
196. O'Malley, at 332, in Sparks, at 12.
197. Sparks, at 26-27.
198. Sparks, at 28.
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its effects. Admittedly, O'Malley requires that the effect be "upon a
prohibited ground" and that the imposition of the special disadvantage be
so because of the special characteristic of the group or individual, but it
does not require that the distinction be based on the characteristic. How
could it be both based on the characteristic and neutral on its face? With
direct discrimination, the rule or standard in question is based on an
enumerated characteristic, such as "no Blacks admitted to public housing,"
but McIntyre J. is clear to distinguish this kind of discrimination from.
adverse effect which is not based on the characteristic, but "affects a
person or group of persons differently from others to whom it may
apply. ' 199
Thus, immediate eviction imposes a special penalty and restrictive
condition upon Ms. Sparks. The special characteristics of her groups, that
Palmeter C.J. acknowledged, will cause her to be affected differently
from others in public housing in that she will have severe difficulty
finding affordable, appropriate housing for her family. Therefore, the
argument would be that the effect of the distinction between public
housing and private housing is discriminatory against social assistance
recipients, who are Black Nova Scotian, single-mothers.
The focus on the Sparks decision is intended to provide an illustration
of the ways in which s.15 could apply to circumstances involving
economic and social rights issues, and allegations of discrimination. It is
also used to show that the courts are beginning to acknowledge the
justiciable nature of the disadvantages faced by those people in economic
need, and that this development with respect to s. 15 flows in part out of
theAndrews decision. On the other hand, however, the Sparks judgement
can also be seen as an example of the judicial reluctance to widen too far
the application of the Charter to matters of social and economic rights,
which Chief Justice Palmeter and many others would argue should be left
to the legislatures to resolve.
3. Summary
Recently, several decisions of the senior courts have illustrated the range
of remedies that may be applied in cases involving positive economic and
social rights. On the one hand, there are the more traditional approaches
which show a great deal of deference to the legislatures. On the other
hand, the remedial authority under s.24 of the Charter may provide for the
more expansive interventionist approach. For these purposes, each shows
that the issues are before the courts, and the drafting of a social charter
199. O'Malley, at 332, in Sparks, at 12.
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must also contemplate which remedies will be possible depending upon
the amendments.
* In Schachter v. Canada Employment and Immigration Commission
et al.,2°° the positive rights interpretation of s.15 was held to be a
justification for an expansive interpretation of the s.24 remedy powers of
the Charter, in order to overcome underinclusive benefits and to ensure
the protection of substantive rights enunciated in s.15. Thus, a more
interventionist approach to a finding that a benefits plan excludes on
discriminatory grounds otherwise eligible applicants can have the effect
of costing the public purse substantially. It has been estimated that
Schachter, if it is upheld by .the Supreme Court, may cost the federal
government between $10 - 50 million.201
* In Reference re: Canada Assistance Plan, the Supreme Court of
Canada overturned the lower courts finding that a federal - provincial
agreement could not be unilaterally amended by the federal government,
thereby allowing the federal government to implement cuts to their
agreed to financial contribution to social assistance programs. Here, the
more traditional deference to the legislature is shown, as the judgment
was ostensibly on the grounds that changes to the agreement were
amendments within the context of the statute and the general authority
falling within the rubric of parliamentary sovereignty.
* In Finlay v. Canada (Minister of Finance),2°2 presently on appeal
before the Supreme Court of Canada, the Canada Assistance Plan
agreement was held to require certain basic needs to be satisfied, despite
the legitimate objective of recovering overpayment. The reduction of
allowances below the level of basic requirements was found to be illegal
and was therefore to be discontinued. Again, the ruling did not find any
positive obligation on the state to provide for basic requirements, per se,
but rather held that the commitment was part of the agreement between
the federal and provincial government. The more traditional remedy
provided, therefore, was in that context.
With s.36(1), the principle of economic justice is enshrined in the
Constitution, although there is some uncertainty as to the effect of the
section. While it has been suggested that s.36(1) be a guide to government
policy, and be seen as an affirmation of rights to the provision of basic
needs, it is also admitted that the role that a constitutional "directive" will
200. (1990), 108 N.R. 123 (F.C.A.), leave for appeal to SCC granted.
201. R. Hasson, "What's Your Favourite Right? The Charter and Income Maintenance
Legislation" (1989), 5 J.L. & Soc. Pol'y 1, at 17.
202. (1990), 71 D.L.R. (4th) 422 (F.C.A.), leave for appeal to Supreme Court of Canada
granted, May 2, 1991.
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have is "open to conjecture. '203 Others have claimed that s.36(1) is the
"only section of the entire constitution which is not enforceable," 2 4
although the certainty of this conclusion has not yet been directly tested.
Nevertheless, it is worthwhile to note that in developing appropriate
remedies in the above cited cases, s.36(1) was not a factor.
Indeed, s.36(1) provides Canadians with a constitutional commitment
of the governments:
s.36(l)... the government of Canada and the provincial governments are
committed to
(a) promoting equal opportunity for the well-being of Canadians;
(b) furthering economic development to reduce disparity in opportunities;
(c) providing essential public service of reasonable quality to all Canadians.
How this commitment affects the lives of Canadians has remained, as
noted, largely ambiguous. In part, the section's caveat, placing the
commitment within the context of the traditional powers of Parliament
and the legislatures, may contribute to the reluctance of the courts to use
s.36(1) for the expansion of positive rights.
Nevertheless, s.36(l) and the remedial powers under the Charter in
s.24 stand out as indicators of the potential width of the courts' powers,
should they be so exercised. For Ms. Sparks, the traditional interpretation
of ss.7 and 15 forestalled any discussion of remedy. Despite the Andrews
decision, and the recognition of social assistance recipients as an
"analogous group" in FAPG (BC) and Sparks, a barrier to equality
arguments regarding the provision of benefits programs such as that
which was considered in Sparks would appear to exist still. And, while
many have argued that subsistence needs do not constitute "pure economic
rights,"205 and the Supreme Court appears to have tacitly acknowledged
this, the withdrawal of benefits such as public housing has yet to implicate
s.7.
It is these anomalies that cause some to consider the Charter to be a
facade, unable to provide substantive equality, while nevertheless raising
expectations. 206 And, itis as aresult of these apparent structural weaknesses
that social charter advocates are motivated to propose the Charter's
reform. While it has been suggested herein that the narrow application of
203. Johnstone, supra, note 69, at 13.
204. Vince Calderhead, Metro Community Law Clinic, in "Alternative Social Charter
Proposed by Groups Across Canada" (March 27, 1992), Press Release - Centre for Equality
Rights in Accommodation.
205. Johnstone, supra, note 69, at 27.
206. Bakan, supra, note 11, at 328.
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the Charter has resulted less from the Charter's weaknesses than from
the courts' principled reluctance, it would appear that lower courts will
continue to exclude social and economic rights to the detriment of people
such as Ms. Sparks unless some direction to the contrary is given.
V. Amendments and Alternatives
In light of the herein outlined uncertainty with respect to economic and
social rights in the Charter, it is not entirely inappropriate for advocates
of entrenched protection of economic fairness to bring forward at this
time proposals for the reform of the Charter. The options range from the
more traditional, institutional model, based upon the '.36(l) commitments,
to the enshrinement of a fully justiciable social charter, to a combination
thereof.
1. A Justiciable Social Charter
Briefly, this model would have the Charter amended to provide a special
list of social rights, as either a new section or as part of several existing
sections of the Charter, such as the mobility rights section, s.6, s.7 or s. 15.
The effect would be to entrench specific social rights, enforceable by the
courts:
The explicit addition of social rights obviously would provide the greatest
judicial protection of social rights .... it would be better able to deal with
cases of injustice that arise not from the welfare legislation itself, but from
its arbitrary administration, or from the unintended effects of other
legislation. It would also help sensitize the public and legislators to social
rights, and might give previously disadvantaged groups a genuine sense of
empowerment, and hence democratic citizenship.27
As noted above, the justiciable model has its critics, who fear the
transfer of power over policy matters to the courts, potentially causing a
substantial remedial expense for governments. As a matter of principle,
it has been argued herein that justiciable social and economic rights are
not antithetical to the Charter, its origins, philosophical underpinnings or
international context. As a matter of practicality, however, the fully
justiciable model appears to have the least political support at this point
in the debate.
207. Kymlicka and Norman, at 5.
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2. The Traditional Model
In January of 1992, Ontario Premier Rae indicated in a presentation to the
Joint Parliamentary Committee on a Renewed Canada that, although his
government initially advocated ajusticiable social charter, he was willing
to support an "expanded s.36 as being... the most productive way to
express this sense of social contract in the country.""2 8 The Premier
further indicated that the social charter should be "a separate part of the
constitution... that would have its own enforcement."0 9 Rae admitted
that the pressure from those concerned about a Charter amendment
which would be enforceable under s.24 had caused him to believe that a
preferred justiciable, individually enforced model had become unrealistic
politically.2" With respect to scope, Rae proposed the following:
Let me stress, however, that it cannot be empty and that it cannot be
rhetorical and that its capacity to be enforced must be real. What should it
cover? Well, it should cover medicare. It has to cover education. It has to
cover the basics of social services and welfare and I would argue that it
needs to coverhousing and the environment as well .... nothingthat we are
putting forward or would argue for is intended to take away from two
things .... existing rights under s.7 and s.15..., and second,... the federal
govemment['s]... capacity to exercise some continuing responsibility as
it relates to the spending power.1 I
Thus, the Rae model is traditional in its focus on federal-provincial
agreements, as well as in its acceptance of the status quo content of the
Charter, without an expanded remedial role for the courts.
Later that same month, and before the same committee, Nova Scotia
Premier Cameron and the two opposition leaders took this model another
step. Specifically, the three party leaders called for protection of established
transfer programs with an amendment to s.36 to provide greater "stability
and predictability in fiscal arrangements" between the federal and
provincial governments. As well, Nova Scotia's political leaders proposed
a new amendment process to involve provinces in the creation of new
programs and a review agency for the annual review of national standards
in social programs across Canada.212
208. Minutes of Presentation by PremierBob Rae, Ontario, to the Special Joint Parliamentary
Committee on a Renewed Canada (January 13 1991), at 10.
209. Ibid.
210. Ibid., at 10, 26.
211. Ibid., at 11.
212. Minutes, Presentation of Nova Scotia Premier Don Cameron, Official Opposition Leader
Vincent MacLean and New Democratic Party Leader Alexa McDonough, to the Joint
Parliamentary Committee on a Renewed Canada (January 16, 1992), at 13.
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The result of the parliamentary committee's hearings, was the proposal
of a new "social covenant," much along the lines of the two premier's
suggestions. The Joint Committee, in its final report, admitted the
"weakness of s.36" and the individual rights focus of ss.7 and 15, and
proposed an amendment to the constitution with the addition of s.36.1,
which would "commit governments to the fostering of the [listed] social
commitments." 213 In addition, the committee recommended that an
intergovernmental agency be created to "review, assess and report on"
the progress of governments in relation to the goals of the covenant.
214
The criticism of the proposed covenant focused on the fear that, as
proposed it could "easily do more harm than good.215 In particular, Scott
argued that the effect of the covenant would be the narrowing of the
courts' interpretation of the Charter, on the grounds that social and
economic rights had been delegated by the legislatures to the new agency.
It was noted by Bruce Porter that the rights listed were "significantly
weaker than Canada's international commitments to social and economic
rights. 21 6 In short, then, while the new covenant might provide greater
political pressure on governments to achieve certain national standards,
it is feared that it could ultimately have a negative effect upon the lives
of Canadians.
3. The Porter "Draft Social Charter"' 217
Developed in coordination with a number of community groups and legal
aid lawyers, the Porterproposal is the most comprehensive and far-reaching
of those presented to date. Influenced by international law and a desire to
go beyond a "statement of values or of government responsibilities," the
Porter proposal includes the following:
* a justiciable list of social rights, "affirming that everyone has an
equal right to well-being," and circumscribed in some detail;
* an interpretive clause protecting existing Charter rights;.
* a restatement of government responsibilities to economic justice, a
monitoring body and a "social rights tribunal." 21
213. Special Joint Committee on a Renewed Canada, Final Report, at 87.
214. Ibid., at 123.
215. Craig Scott, Assistant Professor of Law, University of Toronto, "Alternative Social
Charter Proposed..." Press Release, at 2.
216. Ibid., at cover page.
217. For simplicity's sake, the name of one of its advocates has been attached to what is
apparently a widespread cooperative effort.
218. Porter, at 1-2
610 The Dalhousie Law Journal
A closer look at the Porter draft's substantive proposals, particularly
in contrast with the choices made by the Joint Committee with the social
covenant, illustrates some of its sources, principles and priorities. The
language of Part I, "Social and Economic Rights" '19 appears to be
influenced by Articles 22 (social security), 23 (work and working
conditions), 25 (standard of living, well-being) and 26 (education) of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948, and the subsequent
International Covenant on Social, Economic and Cultural Rights
(hereinafter the ICESCR), 1966 (which includes the above, along with
higher education, young persons). In other words, the language is not
revolutionary and, in light of international obligations, already "binding"




Social and Economic Rights
1. In light of Canada's international and domestic commitments to respect, protect and promote
the human rights of all members of Canadian society, and, in particular, members of its most
vulnerable and disadvantaged groups, everyone has an equal right to well-being, including a
right to:
(a) a standard of living that ensures adequate food, clothing, housing, child care, support
services and otherrequirements for full social and economic participation in their communities
and in Canadian society;
(b) health care that is comprehensive, universal, portable, accessible, publicly administered,
including community-based non-profit delivery of services;
(c) publicprimary and secondary education, accessible post-secondary andvocational education,
and publicly-funded education for those with special needs arising from disabilities;
(d) access to employment opportunities; and
(e) just and favourable conditions of work.
2. The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms shall be interpreted in a manner consistent
with the rights in s.1 and the fundamental value of alleviating and eliminating social and
economic disadvantage.
3. Nothing contained in s.l diminishes or limits the rights contained in the Canadian Charter
of Rights and Freedoms.
4. Governments have obligations to improve the conditions of life of children and youth and
to take positive measures to ameliorate the historical and social disadvantage of groups facing
discrimination.
5. Statutes, regulations, policy, practice and the common law shall be interpreted and applied
in a manner consistent with the rights in si1 and the fundamental value of alleviating and
eliminating social and economic disadvantage....
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It is interesting to note, however, that the right to organize and strike,
found in the ICESCR, is not included in Part I of the Porter Draft.
Furthermore, instead oftheright to work, andrelatedfavourable conditions,
as in the ICESCR, the Porter Draft only speaks of "access to employment
opportunities".
On the other hand, the Joint Parliamentary Committee seems to go
further than the Porter Draft, in language, by "protecting the rights of
workers to organize and bargain collectively".220
It is important to keep in mind, however, that the Porter Draft proposes
an interpretive clause for the Charter, whereas the Joint Committee's
proposed covenant would only be reviewed by a tribunal and a political
body. Thus, where the language is stronger in the covenant, it is also less
certain an influence on the judiciary's interpretation of the Constitution.
Also in Part I, the Porter Draft attempts to respond to the concerns
amongst social charter advocates that any devolution of federal power
will weaken the social policy net by affirming the "special role" of the
federal government in social policy, with respect to the federal spending
power and national standards in the quality and accessibility of services.
In addition, it is recommended that a clause be included which would
counteract the effect of the judgement inReference re Canada Assistance
Plan 22 by giving shared-cost agreements the force of law, enforceable by
the courts. 222 At the "Renewal of Canada Conference" on the division of
powers, participants seemed to agree that the federal government's
spending power should not be exercised arbitrarily, with respect to
initiation of new programs and any changes to existing agreements.
223
Although the Porter proposal has attempted to respond to most of the
weaknesses in the present Charter, it is not without its own drawbacks.
First of all, as with any model, there is a risk that false expectations will
be raised by such a far-reaching set of amendments. While the traditional
model of federal - provincial agreements is not as certain as its critics
would prefer, it is difficult to imagine all the provincial governments
agreeing to such a centralizing document. And, lastly, considering the
present opposition to the entrenchment of positive rights and the concern
220. Joint Committee on a Renewed Canada, at 123.
221. Supra, note 12.
222. "6. Any legislation and federal - provincial agreements related to fulfilment of the rights
in s.l through national shared cost programs shall have the force of law, shall not be altered
except in accordance with their terms and shall be enforceable at the instance of any party or
of any party adversely affected upon application to a court of competent jurisdiction." Porter,
at 2.
223. Conference Report, Renewal of Canada: Division of Powers (January 22,1992), Atlantic
Provinces Economic Council, at 17.
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with respect to the role of the judiciary, it is perhaps a bit too ambitious
to expect such a shift in the structure and nature of the Charter as the
Porter draft foresees.
4. A Social "C" (Another Option)
In light of the suggestion that has been at the centre of this paper, namely
that the present Charter should not be interpreted as being antithetical to
the protection of social and economic rights, another, less ambitious
proposal may be practical.. Consistent with the structure, history and
philosophical underpinnings, it is proposed that all that is needed to
ensure that ss.7 and 15, for example, are interpreted as providing
protection of economic and social rights is an interpretive clause, along
the lines of the s.27 "Multicultural Heritage" clause.
As was argued herein with respect to s.7, matters of economic
subsistence are not explicitly excluded from s.7 protection, although the
courts have thus far interpreted the legal rights section narrowly. As well,
with the recognition of social assistance recipients as "analogous groups,"
s.15 should not be unhelpful to claims regarding the unequal provision of
benefits. Nevertheless, the Sparks decision illustrates all too well the
reluctance of the courts to accept that economic and social rights are
included in the Charter. An interpretive clause, which directed the courts
to allow for the inclusion of such rights in the Charter, may be enough to
influence the courts to adopt a test for s.7 similar to the one proposed
above, and to approach the application of s. 15 to direct discrimination and
adverse effect discrimination also as proposed above. With s.24, the
Charter has the potential to be applied creatively and expansively for
"appropriate and just" remedies, as was the result of Schachter.
An interpretive clause can be successfully applied to cases involving
alleged infringements of other rights and freedoms in the Charter. In
Edwards Books & Art Ltd. v. The Queen,224 for example, s.27 was held to
determine that Canada is a pluralistic society and that the s.2(a) protection
of freedom of religion should be interpreted in that light. Similarly, in Big
MDrug Mart ,21 a government's legislated observance of a universal day
of rest, preferred by one particular religion, was held to be inconsistent
with Canada's multicultural heritage. Thus, an interpretive clause can be
helpful to the courts' application of the Charter, particularly where there
are competing interests.
224. [1986] 2 S.C.R. 713.
225. Supra, note 127.
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With respect to social and economic rights, the courts appear to need
a similar interpretive clause which will reinforce the fundamental principle
of economic fairness, while focusing the discourse on subsistence or
basic needs rather than purely commercial economic rights. In addition,
the social rights interpretive clause would not be a panacea, unduly
raising expectations with promises yet all the while being chimerical.
Therefore, the following is proposed:
social rights s.26.1 .226 This Charter shall be interpreted in a manner
consistent with the inherent dignity of the human2211
person,227 the equalrightto well-being of all Canadians,228




In an effort to contribute to the discourse on the nature and existence of
economic and social rights in the Charter, it has been illustrated that a
subtle web of protection may have evolved over its ten year history, which
has its origin in the document's philosophical underpinnings. By doing
so, the goal has been to illustrate that the Charter does not have to be
re-written to achieve greater security for Canadians most in need. Upon
the existing framework of the Charter, and in the real context of the
circumstances affecting Ms. Sparks, a proposed social "C" has been
proposed.
Fundamentally, the concept of liberty and freedom that is at the centre
of the Charter must include economic fairness. As MacCormick writes:
An economic order which denies such goods as [food, housing, the
opportunity to work] to some persons, or which systematically distributes
them in grossly unequal measure, is as inimical to the equal claim of every
person to self-respect as is a political order which represses liberty unduly
or distributes it in systematically unequal shares. 2 0
It may, therefore, be true that the first-tier of rights to be entrenched had
to be political and legal protection, as Trudeau, Laskin and others
suggested. It is also true, however, that the next phase in our Charter's
growth must be with respect to those rights which are perhaps second-tier,
but are not irrelevant. On the contrary, political freedom is dependant
226. Comment: By adding the section under s.26 of the Charter it is intended to give a specific
example of the "other rights" that exist beyond those enumerated in the Charter.
227. Comment: Similar to the language in the ICECSR, preamble, and consistent with the
MacCormick definition of liberty, as including the self-respect and dignity of the person.
228. Comment: Consistent with the language in S.36(l) of the Constitution.
229. Comment: Similar language as proposed in the Porter draft.
230. MacCormick, p.43.
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upon a well-educated, healthy and economically independent population.
For Canada to further in its legal development, therefore, the clear
protection of social and economic rights in the Charter would appear to
be needed.
It is always worthwhile to entertain in academic studies the broader,
more abstract, perhaps somewhat impractical possibilities. In a work
such as this, "it is possible to reach for the ultimate goal." 31 Yet, for
Canadians such as Ms. Sparks the entrenchment of social and economic
rights in the Charter must achieve more than mere formal, abstract
equality.
231. Trudeau, supra, note 46, at 125.
